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
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
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FINAL REPORT

FIFTH PACIFIC ARMIES MANAGEMENT SEMINAR

16 - 20 NOVEMBER 1981

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
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FIFTH PACIFIC ARMIES MANAGEMENT SEMINAR



CO - HOSTED BY

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COMMANDING GENERAL
PHILIPPINE ARMY


LIEUTENANT GENERAL EUGENE P. FORRESTER
COMMANDER
UNITED STATES ARMY WESTERN COMMAND
FORT SHAFTER, HAWAII

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SEMINAR CO - CHAIRMEN

COLONEL FRANKLIN V. SAMONTE
PHILIPPINE ARMY


COLONEL NOLAN M. SIGLER
UNITED STATES ARMY WESTERN COMMAND



PACIFIC ARMIES MANAGEMENT SEMINAR V
16-20 November 1981
Manila, Republic of the Philippines

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PACIFIC ARMIES MANAGEMENT SEMINAR V

16-20 November 1981

Manila, Republic of the Philippines

COUNTRIES REPRESENTED

AUSTRALIA

BANGLADESH

FIJI

FRANCE (TAHITI)*

INDONESIA

REPUBLIC OF KOREA

MALAYSIA

NEW ZEALAND

PAKISTAN*

PAPUA NEW GUINEA

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

SINGAPORE

SRI LANKA

THAILAND

TONGA

UNITED STATES

*OBSERVERS

PACIFIC ARMIES MANAGEMENT SEMINAR V

16-20 November 1982

ATTENDEES

AUSTRALIA

COL John Boyd HEALY, Director of Training Plans (Army Office)

COL George D. IRVINE, Australian Defense Attache, Republic of the Philippines

COL William P. HOLMES, US Army Attache, Australia/New Zealand/Papua
New Guinea

BANGLADESH

LTC Mohammed MOHSIN, General Staff Officer, Army Headquarters

Wing Commander Syed Farhat Ahmad ROOMY, O. C. Admin Wing, Bashar (BAS)

MAJ ENAYET Hussain, General Staff Officer, Operations Directorate, Army
Headquarters

LTC Hugh M. BAKER, US Defense Attache, Dacca

FIJI

LTC Steve L. RABUKA, Chief of Staff, Royal Fiji Military Forces

INDONESIA

COL ABINOWO Mukmin, Brigade Commander and Assistant for Operations,
7th Military Regional Command, Central Java

COL HARDY Hardiatin, Director of Training, Education and Training
Development Command, Bandung, West Java

COL RADIYON Mustofa, Director of Research & Development, Infantry Center,
Bandung, West Java

LTC Anthony N. NORMAND, USA, Director, Security Assistance Program, Office
of the Military Attache for Defense Programs, US Embassy, Jakarta

REPUBLIC OF KOREA

MG PARK Chun Sik, Commander, 1st Logistics Support Command (Featured
Speaker)

COL KIM Jong Kyong, Education and Training Development Section Chief,
Directorate of Education/Training, DCSOPS, ROK Army Headquarters

LTC KIM Jong Soeb, Staff Officer, Training and Doctrine Command, ROKA
MAJ SHIN Il Soon, Instructor, Army Command and General Staff College, ROKA
LTC John O. PARSONS, USA, JUSMAG-KOREA

MALAYSIA

COL MOHAMMAD Bin Munip, Commandant, Royal Military College

NEW ZEALAND

LTC Edward T. FINNIMORE, Commander, Waiouru Training Depot
MAJ Brian E. HALL, Staff Officer, Army Schools

PAKISTAN

MG Saiyid Fahim Haider RIZVI, Commanding General, Infantry Division
BG Muhammad ASHRAF, Director of Military Training, General Headquarters

PAPUA NEW GUINEA

LTC Paul SOMA, Commander, Goldie River Training Depot
LTC David N. JOSIAH, Director of Training, PNG Defence Force

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

General Fabian C. VER, Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines
Brigadier General Isidro B. AGUNOD, Commandant, Armed Forces of the
Philippines Command and General Staff College (Featured Speaker)
Brigadier General Alfonso TRANCE, Regional Commander, RECOM VI, Philippine
Constabulary
COL Jose ALCANESES, Superintendent, Philippine Constabulary Training Command
COL Rosalino ALQUIZA, Deputy Asst Secretary for Comptrollership, Ministry
of National Defense
COL Eugenio OCAMPO, Jr, C-5, Headquarters, Philippine Constabulary
CPT Emmanuel BARLAAN, Deputy Commander, Naval Training Center, Philippine
Navy
COL Eduardo CABANLIG, Chief of Staff, Philippine Marines
COL Ruperto AMBIL, Deputy for Non-Resident Instruction, AFP Command and
General Staff College

COL Alfredo FILLER, Secretary Constabulary Staff, Headquarters, Philippine Constabulary

COL Romeo D. LOPEZ, G3, Philippine Military Academy

LTC Alberto QUIAOIT, Deputy C5, Headquarters, Philippine Constabulary

LTC Manuel ESPEJO, Operations Officer, Aviation Security Command, Philippine Air Force

LTC Ponciano MILLENA, Chief, Training Branch, J3, GHQ AFP

Commander Jaime V. BANTOLO, Deputy N5, Headquarters, Philippine Navy

LTC Rodolfo GAERLAN, Deputy C2, Headquarters, Philippine Constabulary

LTC Ramon EL MARTINEZ, Jr, Chief, Statistical Division, Office of the Asst Sec of Plans and Programs, Ministry of National Defense

MAJ Damiano N. YALA, Chief, Materiel Management Division, Office of the Asst Sec for Installations and Logistics, Ministry of National Defense

MAJ Reynaldo D. RIVERA, Chief, Miscellaneous Affairs Division, Office of the Asst Sec for Plans and Programs, Ministry of National Defense

MAJ Hercules G. CATALUNA, Asst M3, Metropolitan Command, Philippine Constabulary

MAJ Manuel FORONDA, Chief, Training Branch, A3, Headquarters, Philippine Air Force

SINGAPORE

COL HA Weng Kong, Assistant Chief of General Staff (Personnel)

MAJ TAN Khin Poh, Staff Officer (Engineer)

MAJ YONG Choon Kong, Staff Officer, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff (Training)

COL John M. FITZGERALD II, US Army Attache, Singapore

SRI LANKA

COL Y. R. M. P. WIJEKOON, Formation Commander, North Central Command

MAJ W. M. Patrick FERNANDO, Military Assistant to the Commander, Sri Lanka Army

THAILAND

SP COL THAWAN Sawaengpan, Royal Thai Army Staff College

COL CHALERMCHAI Hiranard, Staff Officer, Directorate of Operations,
Royal Thai Army

COL PISIT Ditsayabut, Chief, Training Division, Royal Thai Army Training
Command

COL George R. GOETZKE, USA, Chief, JUSMAG-Thailand

TAHITI

Commander Andre BAUDSON, French Navy, Armed Forces Attache, Republic of
France (Manila)

TONGA

MAJ Fetu'utolu TUPOU, Commander, Tonga Defense Services

LT Siosaia L. MA'AFU, Military Liaison Officer, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs

UNITED STATES

ADM Robert L. J. LONG, Commander in Chief, US Pacific Command (Featured
Speaker)

LTG Julius W. BECTON, Deputy Commander for Training, TRADOC and US Army
Inspector of Training (Featured Speaker)

BG John W. FOSS, Chief, JUSMAG-Philippines

COL Melvin ALENCASTRE, G3, Hawaii Army National Guard

COL Robert H. BOTTS, Commander, US Army Communications Command, WESTCOM

COL Emory W. BUSH, Commander, US Army Readiness Element, Hawaii

COL John G. FOWLER, Director Battle Simulations Development Directorate,
CATRADA, CAC, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

COL Edward Y. Hirata, G3, IX Corps (Augmentation), USAR

COL Richard D. HOOKER, US Army Attache, Republic of the Philippines

COL Ronald D. SHACKLETON, Deputy Commandant, DISAM

LTC Richard M. ADAMS, J45 Staff, CINCPAC

LTC Gary A. DE BAUCHE, Ground Forces Service Section Chief,
JUSMAG-Philippines

LTC Fred N. HALLEY, Deputy G3, US Army Japan

LTC Jack L. JONES, Director, Air Defense Programs Mutual Defense
Assistance Office, Tokyo

LTC Keith OGDEN, Assistant Army Attache, Republic of the Philippines

LTC Charles J. ROTHLSBERGER, Commander, 1st Battalion, 5th Infantry,
25th Infantry Division

LTC Michael D. SHALER, XO to Deputy Commander for Training, TRADOC

LTC Robert B. TERRY, Maintenance Officer, Logistics Division,
JUSMAG-Philippines

MAJ Timothy J. ASHER, Management Division Foreign Military Sales,
JUSMAG-Philippines

MAJ William E. DOCK, G3 Plans Officer, I Corps

MAJ Frederick A. DREW, G3, Training Officer, 7th Infantry Division

LCDR Gary C. GRIMES, USN, N3 Office, CINCPAC Representative-Philippines

MAJ Robert E. HAYNER, Personnel Exchange Program Officer with Singapore
Armed Forces

CPT Steven H. PHILBRICK, Chief, G3 Training, USAIMA

CPT Robert WORTHINGTON, USAF, 13th Air Force, Philippines

U.S. ARMY WESTERN COMMAND

LTC Eugene P. FORRESTER, Commander (Co-host)

COL Nolan M. SIGLER, Special Assistant to the Commander (Co-chairman,
Secretariat)

COL Thomas H. SPENCE, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans

LTC Robert L. ABRAHAM, SPIRSA Div, DCSOPS (Agenda coordinator, Secretariat)

LTC Joe L. BUTCHER, Northeast Asia Area Officer, SPIRSA Div, DCSOPS

LTC Martin C. FREY, Executive Officer, DCSOPS

LTC Karl P. PIOTROWSKI, Southeast Asia Area Officer, SPIRSA Div, DCSOPS
(Chief of Staff, Secretariat)

LTC Ronald D. TURNER, Chief, SPIRSA Div, DCSOPS

LTC Ted K. YAMASHITA, Chief, Training Division, DCSOPS

CPT John F. CORBETT, Jr, Southeast Asia Area Officer, SPIRSA Div, DCSOPS
(Administrative Officer, Secretariat)

CPT Howard T. SUGAI, Protocol Officer, WESTCOM (Protocol, Secretariat)

SFC Robert L. CREIGHTON, Chief, Analysis/Training NCO, DCSPER
(Administrative NCO, Secretariat)

PHILIPPINE ARMY (PA)

MG Josephus Q. RAMAS, Commanding General, Philippine Army (Co-host)

BG Ramon L. CANNU, Deputy Commander

BG Cirilo O. OROPESA, Chief of Staff

BG Simeon V. VER, Commanding General, 51st Engr Bde

COL David R. ABUNDO, Jr, Commanding Officer, Special Warfare Bde

COL Herminio T. SALAS, Commanding Officer, PACRIS

COL Benjamin N. SANTOS, Commanding Officer, TRACOM

COL Feliciano R. SUAREZ, Deputy Commander, 52nd Engr Bde

COL Franklin V. SAMONTE, G3 (Co-chairman, Secretariat)

COL Restituto PADILLA, Commanding Officer, 1st Bde, 1st Infantry Division

COL Dalmacio G. PIZANA, G6

COL Isagani DELOS SANTOS, Deputy Commander, 3rd Infantry Division

COL Mariano P. ADALEM, G1

COL Pedro Y. VILLALON, G5

COL Victor MAMAWAG, G2

COL Bernabe ORENA, Deputy Commander, HHSG

COL Glotario D. DOLCERFINO, G3, 5th Infantry Division

COL Juanito P. ALLAS, Deputy G7

LTC Abraham C. PARAY, Deputy G3 (Chief of Staff, Secretariat)

LTC Dominador B. HONTUCAN, Deputy G2

LTC Manuel E. ARCE, G5, ARESOM

LTC Victor D. BOLHAYON, Deputy Commander, PALAR

LTC Eduardo M. FERNANDEZ, G3, 2nd Infantry Division

LTC Alfonso P. CAGURANGAN, G3, 4th Infantry Division

MAJ Gregorio M. CAMILING, Jr., Chief, Training Branch, G3

MAJ Antonio J. SALDUA, ACofS, G1, MSC

MAJ Nestor ESTACIO, Army Communications-Electronics Office
(Technical Support, Secretariat)

MAJ Rolando Q. DEGRACIA, Chief, P&B Branch, G3
(Administrative Support, Secretariat)

MAJ Hector P. GARINGALAO, Chief, Management Branch, G4

MAJ Serafin O. ABECIA, Operations Officer, MMSU, MSC

MAJ Francisco A. BODIOLA, Jr., Chief, Scty Branch, OG2

MAJ Benny A. LETRONDO, ExO, MMSU, MSC

MAJ Alberto L. TAN, ACofS, G3, MSC

MAJ Elias G. OTAMIAS, Asst S3, ASG

MAJ Romeo R. DUMAG, Chief, Admin & Actg C, Svc Br, G4

MAJ Dionisio M. ANTIPORDA, Dep Opns O, ASCOM

MAJ Carlos P. GARCIA, G3, 51st Engr Bde

CPT Angel G. ATUTUBO, Asst C, Admin Br, G2

CPT Samuel G. RAMOS, Asst S3, HHSO

CPT Delfin N. LORENZANA, Asst C, Training Branch, G3

1LT Benjamin D. TESORO, Intel & Audio-Visual Officer, PACRIS

1LT Alfredo SAMPANG, Asst S1, 2nd Bn & Actg CO, Svc Co, ASG

MSG Pascual S. MANZANILLA, Commandant, Army NCO Academy

PACIFIC ARMIES MANAGEMENT SEMINAR V

16-20 November 1981

MANILA, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

AGENDA

Monday, 16 Nov 81

0800 - 0900	Registration
0900 - 0905	Call to Order: Seminar Co-Chairmen Colonel Nolan M. SIGLER; WESTCOM Colonel Franklin V. SAMONTE; Philippine Army
0905 - 0915	Welcome Remarks: Co-Hosts Major General Josephus Q. RAMAS; Commanding General, Philippine Army Lieutenant General Eugene P. FORRESTER; Commander, US Army Western Command (WESTCOM)
0915 - 0945	Keynote Speech: General Fabian C. VER; Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines
0945 - 1015	Official Photograph
1015 - 1030	Refreshments
1030 - 1145	Guest Speaker: Brigadier General Isidro B. AGUNOD; Commandant, AFPCGSC and Chairman, AFP Education and Training Board
1145 - 1200	As desired
1200 - 1330	Executive Luncheon (Hosted by PA) - Mayon Room
1200 - 1330	Lunch (Hosted by PA)
1330 - 1415	Presentation: "Training Systems Management in the Indonesian Army"; Colonel ABINOWO Mukmin, Indonesia

1415 - 1430	Coffee Break
1430 - 1500	Panel Organization Meetings
1800 - 1830	Movement to Camp Aguinaldo
1830 - 2030	Commanders Reception at the AFP Centralized Officers Club (AFPCOC). Major General Josephus Q. RAMAS, Host
2030 - 2100	Return to Century Park Sheraton Hotel

Tuesday, 17 Nov 81

0855 - 0900	Call to Order, Administrative Announcements
0900 - 0945	Presentation: "Centralized vs Decentralized Training"; Colonel Y.R.M.P. WIJEKON and Major W.M.P. FERNANDO, Sri Lanka
0945 - 1030	Presentation: "Centralized vs Decentralized Training Management"; Major TUPOU and Lieutenant MA'AFU, Tonga
1030 - 1045	Refreshment Break
1045 - 1130	Guest Speaker: Lieutenant General Julius W. BECTON; Deputy Commander for Training, US Army Training and Doctrine Command and US Army Inspector of Training
1130 - 1230	Lunch (Hosted by PA)
1230 - 1315	Presentation: "Malaysian Army Training Management System"; Colonel MOHAMAD Bin Munip, Malaysia
1315 - 1400	Presentation: "Training Management in the Singapore Armed Forces"; Colonel HA Weng Kong, Major TAN Khin Poh, and Major YONG Choon Kong, Singapore
1400 - 1415	Coffee Break
1415 - 1530	Panel Discussion: "Training Policy, Concepts and Doctrine"
1530 - 1630	Planning Committee Meeting

Wednesday, 18 Nov 81

0855 - 0900	Call to Order, Administrative announcements
0900 - 1010	Panel Reports: "Training Policy, Concepts and Doctrine"
1010 - 1030	Refreshment Break
1030 - 1100	Movement to Malacanang
1100 - 1300	Call on President FERDINAND E. MARCOS
1300 - 1330	Return to Hotel
1330 - 1400	Lunch (Hosted by PA)
1400 - 1445	Presentation: "Battlefield Simulations"; Colonel John G. FOWLER, US CATRADA
1445 - 1510	Presentation: "Management of Shooting in the New Zealand Army"; Lieutenant Colonel E.T. FINNIMORE and Major B.E. HALL, New Zealand
1510 - 1555	Special Guest Speaker: Admiral Robert L.J. LONG; Commander in Chief, US Pacific Command
1555 - 1610	Coffee Break
1610 - 1700	Presentation: "Civil Relations Training"; Colonel Herminio SALAS, Philippine Army

Thursday, 19 Nov 81

0740 - 0745	Call to Order, Administrative announcements
0745 - 0845	Panel Discussions: "Training Methods and Techniques"
0845 - 0930	Panel Reports: "Training Methods and Techniques"
0930 - 0945	Refreshment Break
0945 - 1015	Presentation: "Interoperability of Pacific Armies Communications Systems"; Colonel Robert BOTTS, DCSC-E, WESTCOM
1015 - 1045	Featured Speaker: Major General PARK Chun Sik; Commander, 1st Logistics Support Command, Republic of Korea Army (ROKA)

1045 - 1130	Presentation: "Training Plans and Programs"; Lieutenant Colonel Mohammed MOHSIN, Bangladesh
1130 - 1230	Lunch (Hosted by PA)
1130 - 1230	Planning Committee Luncheon (Hosted by PA) - Mayon Room
1230 - 1315	Presentation: "Concepts of Small Unit Train- ing"; Special Colonel THAWAN Sawaengpan, Thailand
1315 - 1400	Presentation: "Army Unit Training"; Colonel KIM Jyong Hong and Major SHIN Il Soon, Korea
1400 - 1415	Coffee Break
1415 - 1500	Presentation: "Noncommissioned Officer Training"; Lieutenant Colonel Paul SOMA and Lieutenant Colonel David JOSIAH, Papua New Guinea
1500 - 1615	Panel Discussions: "Training Plans and Programs"
1615 - 1700	Steering Committee Meeting

Friday, 20 Nov 81

0855 - 0900	Call to Order, Administrative announcements
0900 - 0945	Panel Reports: "Training Plans and Programs"
0945 - 1015	Chairman's Time
1015 - 1030	Refreshment Break
1030 - 1115	Presentation: "Training Aspects of Force Expansion and Mobilization"; Colonel John Boyd HEALY, Australia
1115 - 1200	Presentation: "US Army Reserve Components and Training Management"; Colonel Emory BUSH, US Army Reserve Element, Hawaii
1200 - 1330	Steering Committee Luncheon (Hosted by PA)
1200 - 1330	Lunch (Hosted by PA)

1330 - 1500	Closing Remarks by Country Senior Representatives
1500 - 1530	Closing Remarks and Issuance of Certificates Lieutenant General Eugene P. FORRESTER; Commander, WESTCOM Major General Josephus Q. RAMAS; Commanding General, PA
1530 - 1540	Seminar Closing: Seminar Co-Chairman Colonel Nolan M. SIGLER; WESTCOM Colonel Franklin V. SAMONTE; PA
1730 - 1800	Movement to Camp Aguinaldo
1800 - 1900	Cocktail Hour at the AFPCOC
1900 - 2100	PAMS V Dinner and Program (AFPCOC). Lieutenant General Eugene P. FORRESTER, Host
2100 - 2130	Return to Century Park Sheraton Hotel

PACIFIC ARMIES MANAGEMENT SEMINAR V
16-20 November 1981
Manila, Republic of the Philippines

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Fifth Pacific Armies Management Seminar (PAMS V) co-hosted by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) (with the Philippine Army as action major service) and the US Army Western Command (WESTCOM) met at the Century Park Sheraton Hotel, Manila, Republic of the Philippines during the period 16-20 November 1981. The main seminar theme was "Training Management." Three subtopics of training management were emphasized during the seminar: Policy, Concepts and Doctrine, Plans and Programs, and Methods and Techniques. Participants from Australia, Bangladesh, Fiji, Tahiti (France) (Observer), Indonesia, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, Pakistan (Observer), Papua New Guinea, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Tonga, and the two co-host countries, Republic of the Philippines and the United States, attended. As with previous seminars, PAMS delegates made plenary presentations, met in smaller panel discussion groups and reported results of their discussions to the plenary sessions.

Colonel Nolan M. Sigler (WESTCOM) and Colonel Franklin V. Samonte (PA), the co-chairmen, called the seminar to order and introduced their respective commanders -- the co-hosts -- Lieutenant General Eugene P. Forrester, Commander, WESTCOM and Major General Josephus Q. Ramas, the Commanding General of the Philippine Army (PA), who later introduced the keynote speaker, General Fabian C. Ver, the Chief of Staff of the AFP.

LTG Forrester commended the Philippine Army for its superb rendition of administrative support and superb hospitality which had established exceptional rapport among delegates during the pre-PAMS orientation week. He then reviewed the purpose of the seminar -- that of providing an apolitical forum where professional army officers can discuss management issues of mutual concern, without attribution or commitment and free of the imperative to search for a consensus. He noted the aggregate experience of the delegates and challenged them to identify and propose solutions, during peacetime, for the problems envisioned as most aggravating to collective defense during wartime. Reiterating the United States' commitment to the defense of the Pacific basin, in cooperation with Asia-Pacific nations, LTG Forrester cited the contributions that could be made by every nation, irrespective of size. Soviet expansionist activities in the Asia-Pacific region and the need for army-to-army interoperability were cited. LTG Forrester reflected on historic Philippine-United States military relationships and the logic of Manila being the first seminar site outside the United States. Lauding the Philippines' exemplary co-host performance, he recommended that the seminar site and hosting rotate among all Asia-Pacific Armies.

MG Ramas extended the courtesies of the Philippine Army to all delegates, then, praising the concept of PAMS, cited the large PAMS V voluntary assembly as evidence of the mutual respect, understanding, and desire for cooperation existing among Asia-Pacific Armies. He highlighted the strategic bond of common defense interests, and declared that the training principles and solutions propounded by PAMS could be adapted to suit the unique situation of

each army represented. He traced the history of PAMS and observed that its substantive findings had been derived entirely from the imagination and zeal of delegates plus the contributions of guest speakers. MG Ramas expressed the view that the establishment of friendships and affirmation of professional camaraderie should be considered of co-equal importance to the accumulation of substantive knowledge, and declared his commitment to both aims.

For the first time in the PAMS series, delegates were treated to the rare experience of an audience with the Chief Executive of a host country. Philippine President Ferdinand E. Marcos received the PAMS delegates and Secretariat at Malacanang Palace and provided an assessment of the geopolitical situation affecting the western rim of the Pacific. His extemporaneous address recounted the historic geopolitical perspective, then, relating recent conversations with a visiting geopolitical analyst, he described contemporary dynamics that are causing world attention to shift from the Middle East to the Western Pacific. He challenged academicians and strategists to re-examine the generic term "security" in light of a predatory Soviet Union alleged to have the capability for waging two wars simultaneously, but which may be confronted by indigenous obstacles around the rim of the Pacific. He noted that nine of the ten largest armies in the world are found within Asia. He spoke of the dynamics produced by shifting alliances, changes of national attention and technological advances in weaponry, especially that of the adversary. He cautioned of the need to think in futuristic terms of an army that could mobilize a million reserves in 48 hours and posed several rhetorical questions, (paraphrased as follows):

What would be the results of a comparative capability study? Could Asian countries, including Japan and China, but without America, balance the forces of the Soviet Union and Vietnam? When will a country too prosperous and too comfortable realize that it cannot remain an industrial power as long as it remains a non-military power? What kind of shock is needed to spur military and political leaders into action: Casualties? Loss of trading power and income? Adverse balance of trade and payments? He concluded with the view that every nation should examine its indigenous capability and signify its willingness to sacrifice in order to deter aggression.

Admiral Robert T. J. Long, Commander in Chief of the United States Pacific Command, provided his perspective of strategic interdependence in the Asia-Pacific area and an assessment of current and impending risks. He highlighted economic statistics that cause much of the world to have a vital stake in the security of the Asia-Pacific region.

Admiral Long cited the ever growing Soviet military capability and sphere of influence and the fact that whether the world likes it or not, it is and will be engaged in a struggle with the Soviets to retain political and economic freedom. He discussed the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the protracted conflict between Iraq and Iran, instability in Southeast Asia, increasing Soviet support to Vietnam, expanded Soviet presence throughout the Pacific, and Soviet endeavors to increase access to the Indian Ocean and Arabian Gulf areas. Admiral Long defined the Soviet Union as a power having the will, capability and history of exerting pressure on any trouble spot to achieve its political objectives. He described Soviet Asia-Pacific ground force

increases of 190% since 1965, and noted that the most modern Soviet weaponry is flowing to those forces. Predicting continuing confrontation with the Soviet Union, Admiral Long warned that military weakness invites conflict. He described the United States' commitments to the Asia-Pacific region and actions being taken to demonstrate and fulfill that commitment. He emphasized the actual role and contribution of friendly and allied forces, and the imperative of achieving interoperability among forces. Joint combined military exercises were cited as an effective means of achieving that goal. Admiral Long pointed out that, although the US has embarked on a program to reverse the adverse trends between the free world and Soviet force levels, each of our allies' efforts to improve its own security forces can contribute greatly to the reduction of Soviet intimidation and make a positive contribution to regional and global security. He concluded with the observation that the leadership and management ability of Asia-Pacific senior Army officers are vital to the maintenance of military strength, and invited all delegates to participate fully in the seminar.

In his keynote address, GEN Ver described restructuring efforts aimed at creating a self reliant force organized to cope with current and probable threats, and equipped and sustained within the limits of indigenous resources that must suffice for both military operations and national development. He prescribed that the Army must be capable of both conventional and unconventional operations as well as full participation in the national development process. Discussing these missions in light of economic constraints, he suggested that developing countries rely on external defense pacts and innovative solutions to remedy organizational and training problems. He foresaw the need to organize compact active forces backed by substantial reserves that, upon rapid mobilization, would require minimum essential training. Noting that rapid socio-economic change and rising expectations are characteristic of developing countries, he described the need for orientation on internal defense and training that would promote social awareness and self-reliance in a variety of conflict environments. He then concluded that a self-trained, highly motivated, responsible and confident soldier represented the most feasible and valuable asset of national defense.

Another highlight of the first day session was a featured address by Brigadier General Isidro B. Agunod, the Commandant of the Armed Forces of the Philippines Command and General Staff College (AFPCGSC) and current Chairman of the AFP Education and Training Board. General Agunod emphasized that the crucial question that should be answered by programers and trainers is "What shall we teach?" He concluded that the real nature, characteristics and dynamics of current and future wars or conflicts should be considered by all planners and trainers in the preparation of programs. Otherwise, he surmised, a nation might allocate resources in a highly efficient manner, yet produce soldiers whose training would be completely irrelevant to the conflict realities confronting that particular nation. BG Agunod elaborated on the Philippine experience in military education and training during the 20th century to illustrate his thesis. He cited numerous instances of indigenous force training being shaped by US global or regional perceptions rather than factors unique to Philippine operational requirements. He concluded that each nation must analyze requirements in the light of its own perceptions and derive training policies and programs from those analyses.

The presentation of Lieutenant General Julius W. Becton, the Deputy Commander for Training of the US Army Training and Doctrine Command and the US Army Inspector for Training, emphasized that effective training is not something that simply happens. It is the end result of a detailed analysis and decision-making process that covers the following points: First, the "Threat" must be clearly identified and decisions made on the size and structure of the forces needed in response; Second, a determination must be made as to what unit/individual training should be conducted in order to accomplish a given mission. General Becton elaborated on US Army training management, the central theme of which is "Centralized Planning and Decentralized Execution." He emphasized that the entire process of planning and conducting training requires continuous evaluation at all levels. In discussing training policies, concepts, and doctrine, it was agreed that a mix of centralization and decentralization is necessary. At the highest level, the present and future threat should be defined and passed down the chain of command to allow lower unit commanders to plan training based on available resources. The closer the approximation of combat conditions in training, the more realistic and meaningful will be the experience of individuals and units. Lastly, General Becton noted that training policies should be based upon national priorities, threat capabilities and available resources.

The featured guest speaker, MG Park Chun Sik, Commander of the 1st Logistics Support Command, Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) discussed the role of the ROKA in nation building. GEN Park stressed that in a rapidly developing nation like Korea, the military can and must play an important leadership role in both day-to-day defense operations and in nation building. He spoke of the need to improve military operational capabilities and to coordinate military training with civil labor requirements so that the nation as a whole, and on a continuing basis, could obtain the greatest benefit from its investment in military training. He cited statistics and case histories to illustrate that this was being accomplished effectively and efficiently. The Korean Army is returning about 200,000 skilled soldiers annually to the civilian sector and about 26% are immediately using skills acquired in the Army. Additionally, there is a substantial outflow of middle managers and senior executives, many trained abroad and in civilian institutions, who continue to serve the nation in governmental agencies and in the private sector. He described the SAEMAIL (new village) movement to illustrate the efficacy of molding national attitudes, then elaborated on Army civic action programs that contributed to agriculture, construction, education, and public health. He asserted that these actions foster an image of the military as being "an Army of the People," therefore, generating support from the people.

The Training Policy, Concepts, and Doctrine segment of the seminar drew upon the keynote address and guest speaker lectures as well as a number of presentations made by country delegates. A presentation on "Training Systems Management in the Indonesian Army" was followed by Sri Lanka's presentation on "Centralized vs Decentralized Training." The same subject was discussed by the Tongan delegation. Succeeding presentations addressed the "Malaysian Army Training Management Systems," "Training Management in the Singapore Armed Forces," and "Army Unit Training" by Korea. The presentations and ensuing

discussions covered the advantages and disadvantages of centralization and decentralization of planning and execution; various options used to decentralize execution of training; controls employed to assure quality of instruction and training; the concept of joint versus unilateral service training of personnel requiring common skills; means for conducting expensive or low-density specialist training; the sensitivity of training to technological change; policies governing mobilization training (determination and satisfaction of requirements); correlation of individual and unit training objectives and standards; utilization of civilian and foreign army education and training facilities; recruit allocation policies affecting unit cohesion; improvements to reserve and non-commissioned officers training; conflict of reserve liability and civilian employment; innovative approaches to managing facilities and time; cost-effectiveness aspects of simulation versus "live" firing and training; advantages accruing to a policy of specific mission oriented training; quality of training as an offset to structural and equipment deficiencies; and the socio-economic role of Army forces in national development. Detailed discussions are contained in the summary of panel reports.

The Training Methods and Techniques segment took note of the Policy, Concepts, and Doctrine findings and drew specifically from the presentations about "Battlefield Simulations" and "Management of Shooting in the New Zealand Army." Those presentations and panel discussions concluded that for an individual/unit to attain proficiency for combat operations, the following training is necessary: individual and collective training, as well as unit training and Command Post and Field Tactical exercises. Periodic evaluations should be conducted to determine proficiency. Simulation and live fire training should approximate actual combat conditions. Training should be cyclic so that proficiency can be maintained. To compensate for cost constraints, use of subcaliber devices and battle simulations should be maximized. Statistics derived from New Zealand's revised shooting management suggest that both effectiveness and economy can be gained from the methods used. The battle simulation presentation covered current and projected systems, their utility and/or adaptability to the Asia-Pacific training environment, and potential savings. A more complete discussion is contained in the summary of panel reports.

The Plans and Program segment featured a series of presentations: "Civil Relations Training"; "Training Plans and Programs"; "Concepts of Small Unit Training" and "Noncommissioned Officer Training." In discussing "Training Plans and Programs," the attendees concluded that the time length of the planning cycle is variable by country but could be determined by the following factors: level of command that undertakes training, the assigned mission, guidance from higher headquarters, availability of logistic support and the training area, the threat situation and the objectives of the training. The training cycle is not determined by the budget alone but by such other factors as weather/seasons and holidays, availability of the training area, recruitment cycle and the time length required to attain proficiency (which is affected by the trainee's skills prior to training). The attendees agreed that for better evaluation there should be a minimum set of standards for all types of training at all levels. Details are contained in the summary of panel reports.

The special subjects segment contained three presentations: "Training Aspects of Force Expansion and Mobilization"; "US Army Reserve Components and Training Management"; and "Interoperability of Pacific Armies' Communications Systems." These presentations enumerated the tasks involved, options meriting consideration, and actions being taken to remedy existing or anticipated deficiencies and problem areas. In common, these presentations addressed the thesis of "how much is possible" rather than "how much is needed," and underscored the necessity for enhancing peacetime readiness through cooperative action between regular and reserve forces and interaction among friendly and allied armies. A manuscript of each presentation is included in the Addendum to the PAMS V Report.

The final afternoon was devoted to closing remarks by the country senior representatives, the co-host commanders, and the closing of the seminar by the co-chairmen.

In their closing remarks, the senior representatives from each country expressed gratitude for the warm hospitality extended by the co-hosts. They noted that, though some language problems were encountered, PAMS promoted better understanding and good relations among soldiers of different nationalities.

The PAMS VI Planning Committee recommended that the next seminar be held in Hawaii or Korea, with the Hawaii site co-hosted between the US and any of the South Pacific Island countries. The Steering Committee voted to conduct PAMS VI in Hawaii in the August-September 1982 time frame. Korea volunteered to co-host PAMS VII. New Zealand will sound out its government for the possible co-hosting of PAMS VIII in 1984. Final dates will be determined later. "Interoperability" was proposed as the overall theme for PAMS VI. The other topics to be considered are "Manpower Resources Management" and "Combat Support and Combat Service Support Management and Systems." For complete details, see the Steering/Planning Committee Report.

PACIFIC ARMIES MANAGEMENT SEMINAR - V

16-20 NOVEMBER 1981

MANILA, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS:

1. Soviet expansionist activities in the Asia-Pacific Region aggravate regional security and complicate definitive planning by compounding the range of missions, external and internal, that must be accomplished by the ground forces of every nation.
2. Developing nations lack the resources required for total, unilateral self-defense; therefore, they must rely upon defense pacts with regional nations to assure sovereignty.
3. Every nation has both the obligation and the capability to contribute to regional and global security.
4. Since collective defense is the only apparent affordable defense arrangement, interoperability among ground forces and supporting air and naval forces becomes an imperative.
5. Interoperability can be enhanced through the exchange of information at professional seminars and similar forums and through the conduct of joint and combined exercises.
6. Cultural understanding and professional camaraderie are critical to achieving the goal of interoperability.
7. Compact, highly mobile regular forces, backed by substantial reserves that have received comparable peacetime training and that can be quickly mobilized, appear to be the most feasible and affordable combination of ground forces.
8. National acceptance and support of the army demands that the army be "of the people and for the people."
9. Armies have an inherent obligation and capability to contribute to national development through routine, active participation in civil projects.
10. Armies must be capable of both conventional and unconventional operations, thereby compounding the nature of the training problem.
11. Each nation should analyze and define current and probable future Army missions; then, by adopting a "mission orientation" training policy, can simplify training with concomitant conservation of resources.

12. A socially aware, motivated and trained soldier represents the most valuable asset in the national defense inventory.

13. The long-term investment in officer and non-commissioned officer training is essential to current force vitality and even more important to mobilization and force expansion on the eve of conflict,

14. Standardized training is conclusive to force expansion and maintenance of quality, but imposes additional costs for units that have short-term or discrete missions.

15. Without studied relevance to probable mission requirements, efficiency of training administration becomes a false virtue.

16. Centralized planning and direction with decentralized execution represents the most economical and flexible training system, but imposes exceptional difficulty in the maintenance of training standards.

17. The training environment should approximate actual conditions of combat, thereby requiring prior psychological preparation of the soldier.

18. Low density specialized training can be conducted most economically and effectively if done centrally.

19. Analysis should be conducted to ascertain that the greatest "time-utility" is obtained from facilities and equipment used for training.

20. Simulation provides a cost-effective means for supplementing "live" firing and training.

21. To optimize the training cycle and gain maximum benefit from resources, consideration must be given to weather, recruiting cycles, and the rhythm of civilian activities and minimum essential skills demanded during successive phases of the soldier's career.

22. Training programs must accomodate technological changes in weaponry and associated equipment and should strive to exploit technology to improve training effectiveness and achieve greater economics.

PACIFIC ARMIES MANAGEMENT SEMINAR - V

16 NOVEMBER 1981

MANILA, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

WELCOMING REMARKS

LIEUTENANT GENERAL EUGENE P. FORRESTER

COMMANDER, US ARMY WESTERN COMMAND

CO-HOST

WELCOMING REMARKS BY LTG EUGENE P. FORRESTER

General Ver, General Ramas, and members of PAMS V:

Let me say first of all that I am delighted to be here and to serve as the cohost for PAMS V. As Colonel Sigler noted earlier, PAMS was conceived as an opportunity to share ideas and to surface problems that could plague us in wartime, in the hope that we could resolve some of these problems in peacetime. As was noted earlier, I have just spent 22 months in the Republic of Korea commanding the Combined Field Army, and I can tell you that we worked diligently there to create an aura of interoperability with the goal of understanding what each nation was going to do before it was done.

I would like to thank you, General Ver, and our Philippine co-hosts, for the enormously effective support that has been rendered for this conference. I have talked with my key US Army staff officers, and they have been universal in their praise of you and your colleagues for making this possible. The physical arrangements themselves, I know, are not simple to provide and you have done so with great care and attention to detail.

As was noted earlier, this is the first time that this conference has been held outside the United States and, therefore, we are privileged to be in the Republic of the Philippines. I would hope that, in the years ahead, we would have the opportunity to go elsewhere so that we could share your countries' cultures and, more importantly, the opportunity to visit you in your own countries.

I wish that I could say this morning that I was an architect at PAMS. I am not. My predecessor, General Wolff, and those people that worked with him over the years did a dramatically effective and creative job refining the concept of PAMS and assembling the thoughts for PAMS V. I think that I can speak with a high degree of certitude in saying that we have the potential here for the best PAMS ever. We have representation, covering a broad range of grades and experience, which is fully capable of addressing the problems at hand. I welcome the opportunity to work with all of you during the coming week.

The preceding week was devoted to orientation, giving many of you a chance to know one another, and to associate and enjoy some of the culture and hospitality offered by the Philippine Military Forces and their Government.

In the week ahead, I challenge you, as professional soldiers, dedicated to the security of this part of the world, to ask tough questions and surface tough issues so that the panels can deal with them forthrightly. As I noted in talking with General Ver a few days ago, my President, my Secretary of State, my Secretary of Defense, and more closely at hand, Admiral Long, who commands the US Pacific Command, have made it abundantly clear that we of the United States have an obligation, a responsibility and a continuing interest in all that takes place in the Pacific Basin. By your very presence here this morning, you signify your interest in cohesion and the opportunity to work

with other nations in bringing the best of our security interests to the fore. I noted, when I was in Australia a couple of weeks ago, that individually, many of the nations involved in PAMS cannot offer large military forces of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps; but collectively, we could become a formidable factor in dealing with the circumstances that pertain in the Pacific Basin. I do not know the reason for the Russian's enhanced interest in this part of the world, but I can assure you that in the last few years we have seen a very significant rise in that interest and, if our capabilities are to be tested someday, it is best that this occur after we have worked together more closely in peacetime.

As I noted earlier, the seminar depends upon your discussions. No voice is too small to be heeded, regardless of the numerical military forces you represent. Because of your professional background and your intuitive judgment as to what some of the problems can be, you can provide a helpful voice, not only for today but the days ahead. I look forward to meeting each of you as the week goes on. I look forward to sharing thoughts with you about the matters scheduled for discussion here, or any other in which you may have interest. If there are particular questions you would like to direct toward me, or to any other of the senior representatives here, we would be very pleased to entertain them.

Again, let me say that I'm delighted to be here. I welcome you on behalf of my Government and my Army. I am just delighted to be a co-host and wish to express appreciation to the Armed Forces of the Philippine and Philippine Government for their very kind hospitality. Thank you so very much.

FIFTH PACIFIC ARMIES MANAGEMENT SEMINAR - V

16 NOVEMBER 1981

MANILA, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

WELCOME REMARKS

MAJOR GENERAL JOSEPHUS Q. RAMAS
COMMANDING GENERAL, PHILIPPINE ARMY
CO-HOST

WELCOMING REMARKS OF MG JOSEPHUS Q. RAMAS

I would like to take this opportunity to officially welcome all our respected and distinguished guests and participants to the Fifth Pacific Armies Management Seminar. We consider it a great privilege for the Armed Forces of the Philippines to co-host this affair, and a greater honor that our country has been chosen as the site for the holding of this conference.

This occasion, to many of us, may well bear a symbolic as well as strategic significance. Symbolic in the sense that all the countries participating in this conference are gathered here today in a spirit of mutual respect and friendship, of understanding and cooperation. And strategic because as armies, we are linked together by common interests and the common purpose of defense. In the pursuit of that objective, the subject of training management becomes vital, relevant, and timely.

It is to be expected that there will be variations in the way each army may apply the principles inherent in training management based on the peculiarities of each one's needs and requirements. Thus, I feel that this seminar provides a fitting venue for exchanging ideas and opinions and in the process, new approaches and solutions may emerge that may help us in further developing and strengthening our respective training programs and policies.

Certainly, there will be much to learn from this venture and from the experience and knowledge of the United States Army and the armies of the nations of the Pacific. Our other Western allies provide a vast resource of training information from which we may derive a great many lessons. At the same time on the part of developing armies such as ours, the development and application of doctrines indigenous to our countries are equally as important and may serve to provide new insights in defense training in this part of the world.

On the whole, this will be an extraordinary opportunity for all of us, not merely to engage in the friendly arena of discussion and communication on a matter of great concern, but even more importantly to discover new friendships and affirm old ties of camaraderie. For in the Pacific, nations and peoples and armies may be separated by vast expanses of space, but the warm and strong personal friendships that are developed here will serve as the indestructible bridges of instant cooperation that could spell mutual success and victory!

In the words of the late great American, General Douglas MacArthur, who served as the Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces in the Pacific during World War II, it is "upon the fields of friendly strife" such as we have today, that "seeds are sown; which, upon other fields on other days, will bear the fruits of victory."

It is in this spirit that we welcome you. It is our sincere hope that the seminar will bear fruitful results and that your stay in the Philippines will be both pleasant and memorable.

PACIFIC ARMIES MANAGEMENT SEMINAR - V

18 NOVEMBER 1981

MALACANANG

MANILA, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS

FERDINAND E. MARCOS

PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS

I don't know what you expect of me, whether I should be speaking on military matters of the seminar or not. But I am a little behind time; so, I will not attempt to do so. Rather, I will speak to you of the facts. Of late, I have been receiving visitors who are interested in the geopolitical situation that affects the Western ring of the Pacific. I have received no less than two or three analysts who have come here, who find that their specialization in the Middle East, Africa and Europe is deficient in view of the absence of any knowledge about the Western Pacific, as well as Asia.

The whole study of geopolitics, of course, has always considered the four power centers of Europe, the Soviet Union, China, (formerly Japan) and the United States, as the interesting points of study, often disregarding what we in Southeast Asia and other Asian countries have considered as the relationship between Japan and mainland China and the other countries around the mainland of China.

I gather that there is a new school of thought which accepts that the Western Pacific is acquiring a new importance, not only in strategic thinking but in geopolitical thinking. Because of this, political leaders are beginning to wonder whether the present studies of academies and schools of soldiery, of tacticians, and of strategists have not missed a point in not having looked into the various subjects that make up the generic term "security," and as to whether the alleged capability of the predatory power--often referred to as the Soviet Union--which was supposed to have acquired the capability of fighting two wars simultaneously, is met with certain indigenous obstacles and difficulties in certain parts of the globe, including the ring of the Pacific.

There is a geopolitical analyst in our midst right now who is probably on an unofficial visit, who met with me last night, who is known as a Middle East and European expert. He has written several books on the Middle East situation, on American intentions and capabilities in Europe and in the Middle East as well as in Africa. I have a suspicion that he has come here on an unofficial visit precisely because he doesn't want to be held back by the conventional wisdom associated with both military and civil governments. He and I had a very interesting exchange until late last night, and I was surprised at his penetrating insight. He, I think, symbolizes the new type of geopolitical analyst. He isn't held back by the old axioms and the old maxims. Oh, yes, he holds a doctorate. He has come from the usual universities. He is a member of the strategic councils, and things like that, but he is very obviously an original and creative thinker. And he tells me that in the days to come, more and more attention will be paid to the Western Pacific. He anticipates that, while the attention of the world and the world's political and military leaders is now concentrated on the Middle East, in due time it will be discovered that nine of the biggest land forces in the world are in Asia. I was shocked when he told me this. We started counting. And he says, of course, you have to count the Soviet Union as Asian. But in your studies, have you ever reached the conclusion that nine out of the ten largest land armies (ground forces) of the world are in Asia?

This, to me, was the beginning of a very interesting conversation. Then he spoke of mobility. He spoke of the fact that there are fast moving changes in alliances, in intentions. And he says, anyone who believes that the plans or capabilities of any nation or group of nations will remain frozen and inflexible over any period of time is due for disappointment. I asked him why. "Because," he said, "not only are weapons changing, but plans for their employment are changing. Also, the creativity of the enemy must not be underestimated. We are now preparing to fight the wars that they started 20-30 years ago...while they are starting new wars." This, again, was a shocker to me. And he said, "How do we know they are not preparing a second generation of weapons? The second generation of weapons may not be the weapons that we are thinking of right now or for this decade."

And so, to me, an ordinary infantryman, who slugged it out in the mud with nothing but an assault rifle, all of this is fantasy. But, perhaps, it will bear us well to think in terms of this man's projections into the future. He told me of some armies capable of calling a million reserves in 48 hours. And then he said, "I wonder how much we strain ourselves by calling up 6,000 men, the ready force from the United States to Egypt, on Bright Star. I wonder what would happen if we made a comparative study?" And I was dismayed. And I said, "You mean to tell me that..." "Well," he said, "right now, yes, but we are trying to remedy all of this. But I am just trying to describe what a difficult situation in which we find ourselves. Don't let's anybody fool you; we are in a difficult situation. Somebody should shock the leaders of the Free World so as to push them into greater alacrity, inclination, and capability to move a little faster, and to sacrifice a little faster. The only problem, of course, is that the politically palatable may not coincide with the militarily acceptable solution or the geopolitically acceptable solution."

And we spoke of Japan. We wondered when it will be shocked into realizing that it cannot remain an industrial power so long as it is a non-military power. He laughed when I said: "But they are too prosperous and they are too comfortable." He asked me: "What kind of a shock do you think will shock the military leaders or the political leaders into acting?" "Of course, I can only guess," I said. But the only thing that shocks political leaders is casualties and losses of trading lanes, losses of income, and adverse balance of trade and balance of payments. This is what merchants understand.

I guess all of these must go into your studies about the Pacific basin defenses. The other thing that struck me was what he said: "Suppose you were to bring together all the forces of all Asian countries, including Japan and China, do you think--without America--that this would balance the Soviet Union and Vietnam?" And, of course, the answer again was shocking: "No!" These are the very penetrating questions that he kept asking me the whole night. And we kept throwing questions at each other.

I didn't expect to meet with you today. Otherwise, I would have taken notes and probably thrown the same questions at you. But, perhaps, as I said, you

and I, infantrymen, are better off lugging a rifle in the mud and going out on patrol. Although even that, at my age, I doubt whether I can perform.

I think it is about time that we thought along the lines that this geopolitician is thinking.

And then he threw one last question. "In the present state of things, are you convinced that the United States can balance the weight of the Soviet Union, gathering all the forces together?" And he said, "Be frank with me." He said, "As of today, is there going to be a war?" And I said, of course, "I don't think so." He said, "That's exactly what I mean." And he then started to draw a scenario. "We need to shock everybody into action. And not just you or even the Japanese, but everybody and the United States." So that was the conclusion for the evening. I said, "Allow me some time to digest all these things that you have told me." He said: "You will, because I am going to put this in a book." He is writing a book on this whole area which will be interesting, I think, not only for the Pentagon and the military planners but also for the political planners, those who would rather cut the budget than prepare to meet possible danger. He says we are avoiding danger, but actually we are moving into a more dangerous era.

And so, I can only say that all countries probably--of course, this was his advice--should now look to their indigenous capability so that they can contribute whatever modest strength they may have to show that there is the will to sacrifice, which probably may be sufficient to prevent any outburst of adventurism in this part of the world. This was his conclusion. He says, perhaps, for the time being, a demonstration of intention of willingness to sacrifice may be sufficient to prevent catastrophes.

I guess that is a pretty good lesson for the day. Thank you very much for coming here. I wish he would tell that to all the leaders of Asia and all the leaders of the world, especially those in Europe. I welcome you to this seminar. I hope that you will keep on meeting and getting together. I do hope that you will stimulate not only the thinking of our people but also of your peoples. Because by holding seminars like this, of course, we hope that the better thinkers among our soldiers, the better tacticians, and the better strategists among the soldiers of Asia will contribute to our common pool of security in the Western Pacific and in Asia.

Thank you very much.

PACIFIC ARMIES MANAGEMENT SEMINAR V

18 NOVEMBER 1981

MANILA, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

ASIA-PACIFIC STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT

ADMIRAL ROBERT L. J. LONG
COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND

FEATURED SPEAKER

ASIA-PACIFIC STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT

Thank you. Lieutenant General Forrester, General Ver, Gentlemen, it's a pleasure and an honor to meet with senior Army officers representing friends and allies from the Asia-Pacific area.

Judging by the calibre of the speakers and the diversity of experience here today, PAMS V will prove to be another in a series of highly successful, working meetings between the armies of the Asia-Pacific area.

I would have liked to have been here on Monday to hear General Ver's keynote address. Last year, I addressed a luncheon gathering at PAMS IV, and I also had the pleasure of keynoting PAMS III. At both of those meetings I gave you my perspective of the strategic situation in the Asia, Pacific, and Indian Ocean areas. I discussed the growing economic and strategic interdependence of the Asia-Pacific area and that US and Free World political, economic, and security interests in this region have steadily increased. Today, for example, US trade alone with its Asia-Pacific neighbors exceeds 120 billion dollars a year, more than our trade with all of Western Europe. And that doesn't count the oil of the Arabian Gulf. That oil, valued at over 200 billion dollars per year, accounts for over two-thirds of the world's total oil imports. The economies of each of our countries, either directly, or indirectly, depends on the continued availability of this oil and on the continued freedom of the seas that carry this vital commerce.

Last year, I focused on potential threats to these vital shared interests regionally and globally. I talked about the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the protracted conflict between Iran and Iraq, and the impact that instability in Southwest Asia could have on the continued availability of Middle East oil. I discussed increased Soviet presence in and over the waters of the Indian Ocean and Soviet ships and aircraft that routinely use ports and airfields in Ethiopia and South Yemen.

I highlighted the impact of Soviet ships and aircraft using Vietnamese ports and airfields, the increasing Soviet military presence and the expanding of their influence in the East and South China Seas, and the increasing of their access to the Indian Ocean and the strategically important Arabian Gulf Area. I discussed Soviet economic and military support to Vietnam. This is aid that is estimated to exceed 3 million dollars a day, aid that sustains the Vietnamese economy and military while the Vietnamese continue to occupy and dominate Kampuchea.

I discussed the Soviet presence in Northeast Asia, increased Soviet naval operations, and the presence of Soviet troops in the Japanese northern territories. I discussed the effect of this total presence on the military balance in Northeast Asia, and along the sea lines of communication leading from the Sea of Japan, south to the Philippines and into the Indian Ocean. That was the situation last year. Little has changed. Today, the Soviets remain in Afghanistan, in Ethiopia, in South Yemen, in Vietnam, and north of Japan. Soviet naval vessels freely operate in the Indian Ocean, in the Gulf of Thailand, in the East and South China Seas, and throughout the South Pacific.

Iraq and Iran continue to battle adjacent to the Middle East oil fields. The oil continues to flow, but the fragility of this flow has been clearly illustrated, first during the early stages of the upheaval in Iran, then most recently, at the beginning of the Iran-Iraq war when the flow of Middle East oil was cut in half.

Iran, with over 25 Soviet Divisions on its northern border, remains an example of a country that has allowed social and cultural revolution to lead to political and economic breakdown, and isolation. Iran remains vulnerable to indirect and direct Soviet involvements as the Soviets increase their military capability and influence. We see the Soviets increasing their support to their proxies, Cubans in Africa and Central America, and Vietnamese in Indochina, and they are also attempting to increase their presence at several key locations along the Indian Ocean littoral.

We must recognize the Soviet Union for what it is, a power that has the will, the capability, and a history of exerting pressure on any trouble spot and expanding its sphere of influence to achieve its political objectives. Just since World War II, 19 countries, over 300 million people, have come under Soviet control and influence, 100 million in just the last few years. It would be naive to believe Soviet claims that Soviet military adventures are defensive in nature.

We can not measure Soviet intentions, but we can measure Soviet military capabilities and actions that give force to their political ambitions. Over the last 15 years, the Soviets have not only significantly increased the size and the scope of their military operations, but they have dramatically improved the quality of their forces, and we see these trends continuing.

In the Asia-Pacific Area, since 1965, they've increased their ground forces by 190%. The number of surface combatants has increased by 40%, and their submarines by about 20%. But the change hasn't just been in numbers. The Soviets are today deploying their most modern forces to their Far East military districts. The most modern series of weapons, which used to be deployed to other areas first, are now coming off the production lines and going directly to Asian units: T-72 tanks, backfire bombers, and naval vessels like the Minsk and the Ivan Rogov.

Unable to effectively compete economically and ideologically, the Soviets are competing in the area that has brought them the most success, the exportation and exploitation of military power.

Whether the Free World wants it or not, it is engaged in a struggle with the Soviet Union, a struggle to retain their political and economic freedom. Fostered by growing Soviet military power, confrontations with the Soviets will continue to occur in the political, economic, and military arenas, sometimes greater in one than the other, but a continuing confrontation. It is their very inability in the economic and political areas and their success in the exploitation of military power that most seriously threatens world peace and regional stability. To allow the Soviets an overwhelming military advantage only invites conflict, conflict that can occur on three distinct but

interrelated levels. The first level that must be deterred is nuclear war. While at present, I think the probability of a global nuclear holocaust is quite low, I also firmly believe that to allow the Soviets a perceived superiority in nuclear weapons is like allowing the Soviets to hold all of the aces in a poker game, it allows the Soviets to bluff or blackmail the Free World. It gives them or their surrogates great leverage in lesser confrontations. Today, the United States' nuclear umbrella of bombers, missiles and ballistic missile submarines not only deter nuclear war, but they also prevent the Soviets from increasing the stakes in this global poker game.

The second level of conflict that we must deter is that of global conventional war. If we permit a military imbalance to occur, whether in Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, or in Southwest Asia, we increase the probability of further Soviet adventurism. Together, the US and the rest of the Free World must demonstrate, convincingly, that a conventional war will not serve the Soviet interests. It is for this reason that the United States has embarked on a program to reverse the adverse trends in Free World and Soviet force levels, so that the U.S., along with its allies and friends, is capable of preventing a direct Soviet attack and, if necessary, responding with a force that is sustainable and capable of winning in any conflict with the Soviets.

The third level of conflict that we must deter is one that we have been experiencing throughout the last decade. That is, regional conflict sponsored either directly by the Soviets as in Afghanistan, or indirectly through proxy or surrogate forces as in Angola, South Yemen, Ethiopia, El Salvador, or Vietnam. If the Free World does not use its political, economic, and military strength to resist the Soviets in these regional conflicts, we face the prospect of escalating the conflict to higher levels.

The United States is doing more now. The experiences of the last few years have caused a profound change in American attitudes. They have brought about a renewed confidence and a national commitment to increasing United States' military capability.

We are maintaining a continuous naval presence in the northern Arabian Sea of about 30 ships, to show our commitment and concern for this area that's so vital to Free World economic and strategic interests. The newest navy ships, like the Los Angeles class nuclear attack submarine and the Spruance class destroyer, are being deployed to the Pacific Fleet. Many of our ships, submarines, and aircraft are equipped with the Harpoon antiship missile.

We are increasing our logistics capability to support our deployed forces. We have prepositioned several logistics ships in the Pacific Theater with equipment to rapidly support up to 12,000 combat ready Marines, Air Force fighter squadrons, and elements of our Rapid Deployment Force that you have heard about.

Airborne Command and Control, or AWACS, aircraft are now permanently assigned in the Western Pacific. These are the same type of aircraft that the US

deployed to Saudi Arabia and more recently to Egypt, at the request of those governments, to enhance their air defense capabilities.

We are modernizing our forces throughout the Western Pacific: F-15's have replaced F-4's on Okinawa, F-16's have begun arriving in Korea, and the A-10 close air support aircraft will be assigned to Korea next year.

All of our forces are increasing the scope and intensity of their exercise activity. As you know, many of these exercises are bilateral exercises that enhance the training, and interoperability of US forces with your Army, Navy, and Air Forces. Participation in these joint and combined exercises is one of the most effective ways we have of enhancing our collective capabilities.

As the United States stretches its forces to respond to widening global threats, it is important that friends and allies recognize that flexibility of employment is necessary to meet the threat, that deployment of ships from the United States' Atlantic or Mediterranean fleet or from the Western Pacific, is in response to the widening scope and nature of the threat.

As US Forces are spread thin by this widening commitment, each of your country's efforts at increasing its own security can contribute greatly to enhanced regional security and stability. When the total strength of the Free World is brought to bear, the power of Soviet intimidation is reduced. For this reason it is essential that the Free World demonstrates its resolve in resisting the Soviets economically, politically, and militarily, so that all countries recognize that the Free World is serious about defending its vital interests wherever they are challenged.

Political and economic strength is certainly most important in the Free World's efforts to thwart Soviet objectives, but we should clearly recognize that military strength is fundamental to deterring Soviet aggression. As senior Army officers, your leadership, skill, and management ability will be instrumental in developing and maintaining the military strength in your countries. This week, at the Pacific Armies Management Seminar you will expand your talents and management skills, contributing to your own national defense, regional stability, and the defense of Free World interests throughout the Asia-Pacific Area. I encourage your active and thoughtful participation.

PACIFIC ARMIES MANAGEMENT SEMINAR - V

16 NOVEMBER 1981

MANILA, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

TRAINING MANAGEMENT IN THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES
POLICIES AND GUIDELINES

GENERAL FABIAN C. VER

CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES

KEYNOTE SPEAKER

TRAINING MANAGEMENT IN THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES: POLICIES AND GUIDELINES

It is a distinct honor for us to co-host this gathering and, on behalf of the general officers, major service commanders, officers and men of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), I would like to reiterate our warm welcome to member-representatives of the various armed forces of countries participating in the Fifth Pacific Armies Management Seminar.

I take great pleasure, indeed, to meet with you for the first time, having taken over just recently the post of Chief of Staff of the AFP from General Romeo Espino, who brilliantly and capably led our armed forces during the period of martial law in our country. It was during this time that, under the guidance and leadership of our Commander in Chief, President Ferdinand E. Marcos, the development and restructuring of our armed forces towards a self-reliant, professional, and capable defense force really began in earnest. Hence, I consider this occasion and this affair a very fitting opportunity to exchange views and ideas with you on so vital a topic as training management in our respective armed forces.

Before I delve into the main substance of my discussion, I feel it necessary to present an overview of the nature of our defense role and the environmental requirements that logically shape the thrust and objectives of training in the AFP.

To begin with, let me state the AFP's mission, which is: "to uphold the sovereignty, support the constitution and defend the territory of the Republic of the Philippines against all enemies, foreign and domestic; advance the national aims, interests and policies; plan the organization, maintenance, development and employment of its regular and citizen reserve forces for national security."

The main thrust, therefore, of our mission is defense.

In the perception of a developing country in the Asian-Pacific Region, such as we are, the term "defense" must necessarily consider the following realities:

First is the economic factor. The heavy burdens of development cannot readily absorb the high costs of maintaining the logistics of a modern army. Nevertheless, we are determined to pursue a self-reliant course, which means that we are developing our indigenous resources to meet our operational requirements and we are ready to fight on the basis of whatever resources we have at present.

The second relates to our military capability. Obviously, we will have to lay aside any idea of nuclear defense at this stage. In meeting the possibility of external aggression, which naturally implies a superior enemy force, our

limited weapons capability will certainly serve as a drawback, but then again, our strategy is to make it costly for the enemy to invade our territory. Additionally, we have bilateral and multilateral defense pacts which may be invoked in the face of imminent and actual external aggression.

At present, we do not perceive any serious external threat emerging within the foreseeable future. However, the reality of probable conflicts that may possibly erupt in this region cannot be discounted. We must remember that Asia today, lies in the crossroads of world politics. Thus it cannot isolate itself from the focus of world interest and involvement because of its strategic potentials, not only militarily, but also in the economic and political sense.

The third factor to consider is the reality of internal security problems. The dynamism of rapid change that developing countries have to contend with has created problems of rising expectations that can often lead to conflict situations. In this context, the problems of insurgency and subversion are immediate threats that will have to be resolved, not only by a military approach, but also by socio-economic and political considerations. The involvement of the AFP in national developmental efforts recognizes the fact that national security is the sum total of a stable political, social, and economic environment and, therefore, to contribute to the attainment of a balance in all these aspects is as much our concern as is our ability to secure our shores from internal and external aggression.

Based on these countervailing and interrelated factors, we are guided by the principle of economy of force in the development of our armed forces and in meeting the immediate, as well as probable threats to national security.

This entails the organization and training of our defense forces, not only in the conduct of conventional warfare, but also with equal emphasis on unconventional warfare. The nature and pattern of the conflicts that have emerged in Asia have implicitly set the requirements for a new orientation in defense operations, based on the effective use of unconventional warfare in counter-insurgent and guerrilla operations. Our own experience in Mindanao is an example of situation that effectively used both conventional and unconventional methods of combat operations. This, to my mind, provides a sound and suitable approach in meeting the peculiar requirements of defense and national security.

Within this context, training is geared towards the development of the soldier as the most critical factor in our defense capabilities. Without the kind of material resources that could be used to influence the outcome of any battle, I believe, therefore, that the soldier remains the most potent weapon in combat.

For this reason, I have laid emphasis on the following points as the main principles in our training program.

One - The development of a self-trained, highly proficient, and highly motivated soldier. This requires intensified physical training and refining of combat skills, as well as developing his will, discipline, and esprit de corps. Considering that the soldier is expected to fight not only a physical war but also a war of ideas, he must not only be a capable fighter; he must also know what he is fighting for.

Two - The soldier must be trained to be self-reliant and innovative. He must be able to operate under varied conditions of stress and at the same time, make decisions vital to the accomplishment of his mission. In the military organization, we know for a fact that not all situations are covered by instructions. In critical moments, the soldier should be able to fall back on his training, knowledge of the organization, and experience in solving problems and taking appropriate action.

Three - The soldier must be trained to be socially aware and responsible. Within the framework of the society to which the soldier belongs, he must therefore play not only a military role, but also a developmental role such as a change agent and catalyst for peace and stability.

Thus, along with the basic military preparedness training that a soldier receives, we have included another training requirement called the Motivational and Enlightenment Program (ME) or TANGLAW, which is the acronym for Tanod At Gabay Ng Lahi At Watawat. This ME or TANGLAW Program keeps the soldier informed and oriented in the various social, economic, political, cultural, and historical aspects that operate in the life of the nation and puts him in the proper perspective with regard to his place and role in society.

Hence, this dual aspect in training, both military and nonmilitary, provides the core in developing "the total soldier and the total citizen" who is trained, proficient, motivated, self-reliant, and socially responsible, and thus, relevant to society in time of war as well as in peace.

On a wider scale, training envisions the development of a compact, self-reliant, and capable force-in-being backed by a strong, mobilizable reserve.

The traditional policy of the country is to maintain an army of minimum size consistent with the immediate needs of the nation but capable of rapid expansion in the event of national emergency. This policy demands maintenance of the ability to mobilize rapidly. Since time is all important during mobilization, training requirements are reduced to absolute essentials. Peacetime training, on the other hand, must serve to determine those essential requirements and at the same time provide a well trained force ready and available for immediate employment if required.

Due to changing world conditions, no one can predict positively how the army will be employed in the future; however, it must be ready to pursue national objectives in the face of any threat. Among the threats are limited wars similar to what the army has fought recently. Training needs created by low, middle, and high intensity conflicts are met through normal training. The trend of present conflicts has generated requirements that dictate increased emphasis on internal defense and internal development training.

Training management, therefore, involves the planning, programing, and supervision necessary to accomplish the assigned training missions and objectives.

Training for regular forces includes both formal training phases and operational readiness training.

Formal training phases are conducted by the respective major services for newly activated units and include: basic combat training, advanced individual training, basic unit training, advanced unit training, and field exercise and maneuver training.

Operational readiness training is conducted by units which have completed formal phases and are assigned responsibility for continuous readiness in support of operational and contingency missions. Operational readiness training includes both mission training and organizational maintenance. Mission training is oriented both to the unit TOE mission and to assigned operational and contingency missions. The overall objectives of operational readiness training are to:

- A. Correct deficiencies in previous training;
- B. Develop and maintain a state of unit training readiness to accomplish assigned operational missions and to include special operations in various environments;
- C. Prepare to take to the field for extended combat operations on short notice;
- D. Maintain a satisfactory state of material readiness at all times.

Additionally, programed and unprogramed unit and in-service training courses are conducted by various training centers of the different major services. All military courses include cross-training with scout ranger/special warfare training to enhance troop capabilities for unconventional warfare. A rotation policy is being implemented to give needed respite, training and reequipping of military units in the field. Likewise, refresher training is conducted by field units. To develop professionalism in the ranks, the AFP extends scholarships for collegiate, graduate, and professional courses both in local and foreign schools.

The development of a well trained and easily mobilizable reserve force capable of responding to any crisis of national magnitude is inherent in the mission of the armed forces. This is achieved through the establishment of mobilization centers throughout the country for the purpose of updating records, training, organizing, and testing reserve units.

The reserve force constitutes the final bulwark of defense of the country. The Constitution specifically mandates that "the defense of the state is the prime duty of the government and the people."

In implementing the provisions of this basic law, the National Defense Act prescribes the territorial organization for defense, the training of the reserve force, and the obligations of all citizens.

Overseeing the activities of the reserve units and administering them are the responsibility of the home defense units. These are in charge of updating records and organizing, training, and testing reserve units. Reserve units undergo retraining through mobilization tests as frequently as the training program allows.

With this territorial reserve force backing up the standing force, the concept of total and comprehensive defense is achieved.

This, in a nutshell, provides the policies and guidelines of training management in the AFP.

As will be noted, therefore, the capabilities of the AFP do not rest solely on materiel capability but rather on the state of training of its personnel. The responsibility of bearing arms for the defense of the Republic provides the guiding light in the pursuit of this mission.

PACIFIC ARMIES MANAGEMENT SEMINAR - V

16 NOVEMBER 1981

MANILA, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

MILITARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING -
THE PHILIPPINE EXPERIENCE

BRIGADIER GENERAL ISIDRO B. AGUNOD
COMMANDANT OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES
COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE
FEATURED SPEAKER

MILITARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING - THE PHILIPPINE EXPERIENCES

This presentation is one of the several keynote presentations which, hopefully, could provide insights and inputs for your working seminars which cover the three broad fields of training management policies, training programs, and training methods and techniques.

As we discuss and exchange ideas about training management policies, programs, and techniques, at the back of our minds we should dwell a more fundamental basic question, what shall we teach?

The failure to ask and answer that vital question could result in military education and training programs, policies, and techniques, that may be highly efficient in the allocation and use of resources, but which may be totally irrelevant to the realities of wars and conflicts which will confront the graduates. There is the real danger that management seminars like this may enamor us with military education, training programs, policies and techniques that shine with brilliance and precision in the organization, direction, equipment, design of facilities, battle simulation, lesson planning, control and coordination of training activities, but which do not correspond to the real nature, characteristics, and dynamics of the wars that have occurred, or could occur, in the Western Pacific Basin.

Perhaps an example of our Philippine experiences in military education and training during the 20th century could give us better insights into the dangers about which we speak.

Let us retrace events from the turn of this century. About the year 1900, after the Spanish government had ceded the Philippine Islands to the United States at the Treaty of Paris, the defense of the Philippines and the concomitant task of educating and training defense forces became a problem. After the Japanese imperial fleet smashed the Russian fleet in the Battle of Tsushima Straits in 1905, Japan arose as a Western Pacific power capable of challenging the American forces in the Pacific Basin. In 1907, the American military leaders in Washington gloomily admitted that the Philippines, located more than 6,000 miles from the US West Coast, could not be defended against Japan which was located very much closer to the Philippines. Thus, War Plan Orange One, the first of a series of US war plans against Japan, came into being. War Plan Orange One's concept of operations envisioned that in case of an all out attack on the Philippines by Japan, the US Navy and Army forces in the Pacific would fight retrograde battle actions to allow US forces and citizens in the Philippines to be pulled back to Hawaii or the US West Coast, and concede the Philippines to the Japanese to be retaken at an opportune time. Before full scale military education and training of US forces in the Pacific area could be undertaken, the American President ruled that conceding the Philippines to the Japanese was politically unacceptable. Back to the drawing boards went the American military leaders in Washington. They came up

with War Plan Orange Two whose concept of operations envisioned the Philippines as the westernmost bastion of US defenses, a springboard from which the US Navy and US Army would operate to defeat any hegemonistic intentions of Japan in the Pacific Basin. This was the period before Germany arose, once again, to threaten the European and Atlantic areas. Under the new plan for the defense of the Philippines, US Navy bases and US Army camps were established in the Philippines. Military education and training for the US forces, plus the new Philippine forces which were inducted as part of US forces in the Western Pacific, proceeded along the concepts of War Plan Orange Two. But War Plan Orange Two was doomed when Germany became a clear and greater danger to the US global interests in the 1930s. Even at that time, the probability was high that Germany and Japan would eventually be joined against the allied powers. Under such conditions, the existing US Army and Naval forces would not be sufficient for simultaneous actions in Europe and in the Pacific. Thus War Plan Orange Three began to take shape in the early 1930s. It envisioned the US Army forces in the Philippines to retreat to the peninsula of Bataan and the island of Corregidor, which both guard the entrance to Manila Bay, and hold out for at least 6 months while the economic and demographic might of America could be mobilized to furnish war forces for both Europe and the Pacific. The education and training of US forces and Philippine Scouts were conducted along the concepts of War Plan Orange Three. The island of Corregidor was built up as a fortress guarding the entrance to Manila Bay, and defense positions, particularly coastal battery positions, were started on Bataan Peninsula. But even before the education and training of defense forces could get fully under way under War Plan Orange Three concepts, a new development arose which changed Philippine defense concepts anew.

The Switzerland model of defense for the Philippines took shape in 1935 when General MacArthur was taken in as the military adviser to the new Commonwealth of the Philippines that was inaugurated in 1935. General MacArthur had no faith in War Plan Orange Three reasoning that it would take more than 6 months for America to mobilize economic and demographic powers and generate sufficient forces to go on the counteroffensive. By then, he believed, the Japanese forces would have smashed the US and Philippine defense forces in Bataan and Corregidor. Shaping his own concepts for Philippine defense along the Swiss model, General MacArthur divided the Philippines into 10 military districts, each to be defended by at least one Philippine Army division. The US Army division in the Philippines would be mobile forces to reinforce the Philippine Army divisions in any military district under attack by Japanese forces. The time frame he planned for the Philippine Army divisions to be fully organized, equipped, and trained covered the period 1935 to 1945 so that by the time the Philippines gained full independence in July 1946, she would be fully capable of defending herself. All of MacArthur's defense concepts were written into Commonwealth Act Number 1 of 1935, otherwise known as the National Defense Act of the Philippines.

But geopolitical, economic, and military realities doomed the Swiss model of defense for the Philippines. America could not provide the war materials intended to equip the Philippine Army divisions, as scheduled. Neither could the impoverished Commonwealth Government of the Philippines provide the training sites, facilities, the uniforms, the pay and allowances, and the

thousand and one other quartermaster items for the ten Philippine Army divisions, as scheduled. And while the National Defense Act of the Philippines specifically provided for a military academy for training cadets, it had no specific provisions for the education and training of Philippine Army NCOs junior officers, senior officers, and generals.

By 1941, with the war between Japan and America imminent, MacArthur's concepts for Philippine defense were very far behind schedule. While numerically superior to the expected Japanese invasion forces, the Philippine Army divisions were ill-organized, ill-equipped, ill-educated, and badly trained to cope with the realities they eventually had to face when the Japanese invasion forces came ashore at several points of the country in December 1941.

Alarmed by the seeming ease by which the Japanese invasion forces had in smashing through the echeloned US and Philippine Army divisions, General MacArthur issued the order: "War Plan Orange Three in effect!" In other words, he was ordering the US and Philippine defense forces to unlearn all that they had been educated and trained for in the preceding 6 years, and to relearn the concepts of War Plan Orange Three, even while executing retrograde actions towards Bataan Peninsula and Corregidor Island. Surprisingly, the retrograde actions succeeded. But it was not so much because of the skill by which it was executed, which would then have to be attributed to excellent education and training, as much as because of the surprise by which the change in war plans caught the Japanese. But as General MacArthur feared, War Plan Orange Three had no hope for success since the war in Europe took priority over the war in the Pacific. No reinforcements were possible. The US and Philippine defense forces in Bataan and Corregidor were smashed after a few months in positional warfare, which their prior 6 years of education and training had not prepared them for.

The next Philippine experience in education and training for war again begged the question: How well were the Philippine defense forces educated and trained for the "resistance warfare," which they conducted during the next 3 years, 1942 to 1945, against the Japanese occupation forces? Nothing in the series of Orange War Plans, nor in the National Defense Act of the Philippines envisioned military education and training for "resistance warfare." The lack of education and training, not only for the military forces, but also for the political leaders and every Philippine citizen in "resistance warfare" greatly dissipated the effectiveness that could have been obtained in such warfare.

The end of the war in the Pacific in 1945 did not mean the end of war and conflict in the Philippines. We faced a new kind of war, a type of war decided upon by the Communist international movement when their worldwide representatives met in the first COMINTERN Conference in the city of Baku along the Caspian Sea in Russia in 1921. There, they had decided on a direct confrontation with the western powers in communizing the whole world. It would first require taking away most countries of the Third World so that the strength of the western powers would wither away enough for a direct confrontation by the COMINTERN powers. Lenin made a revealing statement of the Communist doctrine for world conquest after that first COMINTERN Conference

when he said, "The road to Paris lies through Peking," meaning that the Third World Nations must first be won away from the western powers before the COMINTERN powers could risk direct confrontations with the western powers. Thus, we in the Philippines came to know this new type of war, the so-called "war of national liberation."

We were not organized nor educated and trained for this new kind of war. The Philippines defense forces had been demobilized and in their place was created a large military police command. Fashioned in 1945-1946 after the US Army organization in the Philippines, it attempted to control the rapidly expanding "war of national liberation" launched by the Communist Party of the Philippines and its military arm. The Military Police Command of the Philippines proved unable to control the upsurge of Communist insurgency, and the Philippine Constabulary was reactivated. They also proved inadequate for controlling the battle tested Filipino Communist regimental commands. Philippine Army units were reactivated to do battle with the well armed Filipino Communist forces, who undertook classic subversive insurgency strategy and tactics. This left our troops bewildered and demoralized as the Filipino Communist forces sacked and burned towns and military camps. We had been educated and trained for conventional war and this new kind of war was proving our previous military education and training as irrelevant to "wars of national liberation." By 1950, the Filipino Communist forces stood in the towns on the eastern outskirts of Manila, red Communist flags flying and the question was not "if" but "when" the Filipino Communist forces would smash through the city's defenses to take the President's office and residence.

Fortunately, the protracted nature of subversive insurgency allowed our political leaders and military forces time in which to be educated and trained by the bitter lessons of the war, that not only the force of arms, but more importantly "the winning of the hearts and minds of the troops, the people, and the insurgents" was crucial to the decisive defeat of Communist insurgency.

The bitter lessons we learned in that first close encounter with a third kind of war, the so-called "national liberation," also educated and trained us how to organize, equip, employ, and sustain Philippine Army battle units which were called Battalion Combat Teams (BCTs). These were fully integrated with air support from the Philippine Air Force, and proved to be beautiful fighting machines, capable of operating independently for long periods in jungled mountains or difficult swamps. Each BCT, had its own intelligence units, its own artillery and heavy weapons companies, as well as its own civil affairs units. The civil affairs units enabled the BCTs to pay for everything they took, used, or unintentionally damaged, and to represent the people in courts of justice.

By 1954, the Communist insurgency in the Philippines was smashed, its leaders killed or captured, and its members rejoining the government in large numbers.

But also in 1954 came a development which was destined to educate and train the Armed Forces of the Philippines toward a kind of war which would later prove to be irrelevant to any Third World Nation which was faced by the main threat of Communist subversive insurgency. In January of 1954, the US announced its "policy of containment" to fence in the Communist bloc with

interlinking military alliances around the Communist nations. Any attempt by the Communist nations to smash this ring of containment would be answered with execution of the US doctrine of "instant, massive retaliation" with nuclear weapons. The driving force behind this "policy of containment" was the experience of the Korean War, 1950-1953. North Korea had been the aggressor, and it was feared that there could be similar Communist aggressions in the future unless they could be deferred by military containment and the threat of nuclear retaliation. The ring of containment around Russia, China, and the other Communist countries were formed by NATO in the West, CENTO in the Middle East, and SEATO in the Far East. The Philippines, as a member of SEATO, was oriented toward conventional war. The scenario was that the Communist air forces would strike the Philippines, followed by Communist ground forces invading the Philippines, Korea style.

Completely forgotten was the basic Communist doctrine for world conquest by means of unconventional wars in the Third World. Also forgotten was that the biggest loss to the Free World, China, happened through unconventional warfare, and that "wars of national liberation" had been raging in many Third World Nations. Even the shocking defeat of the French forces by the Vietminh at Dien Bien Phu, only a few months after the "policy of containment" and doctrine of "instant, massive retaliation" were announced, did not awaken us to ask the obvious question: was the policy of military containment the way to contain communism?

Not having asked that question, the Armed Forces of the Philippines efficiently shifted from its counterinsurgency capabilities to conventional war capabilities. Its beautiful fighting machines, the Philippine Army Battalion Combat Teams, were deactivated and instead, replicas of US division formations were organized, equipped, and trained using the latest US developments in Army division concepts. First, the pentomic division concept was utilized, later the ROCID concept, and then the ROAD concept. When that proved to be too expensive, the Philippine Army light infantry division concept was adopted. These were all oriented to conventional war. The Philippine Air Force, long familiar with air support to the ground forces in the counterinsurgency campaigns, was provided with jet fighter interceptors that were integrated into the worldwide ring of air defense zones around the Communist bloc of nations.

By the early 1960s, the Armed Forces of the Philippines had transformed itself from an effective counterinsurgency force to a force of limited capabilities and doubtful value in conventional war envisioned in the scenarios against powerful Communist forces.

In the meantime, Communist penetrations occurred in the Middle East after the Suez Canal incident in 1956-57, and Communist subversive activities took place in Central and South America, in Africa, and in Southeast Asia.

By 1965, South Vietnam was in danger of falling to the Viet Cong, forcing US military intervention. Communist insurgency movements once again plagued the Philippines, Malaysia, and Thailand. Indonesia almost fell to a Communist subversive plot in 1965.

Not once did the "policy of containment" nor the threat of "instant massive retaliation" with nuclear weapons deter the Communists from pursuing their basic doctrine for world communism by first subverting Third World Nations.

By 1972, the Philippines was faced, not only with a full-blown subversive insurgency, but also with an externally supported secessionist insurgency organized and employed along Communist insurgency doctrines. The Philippine Army divisions, organized and trained for conventional war, had difficulties adjusting to the realities of Communist insurgency wars. Strange to say, our AFP schools continued to educate and train our officers and men for the wars in the European battlefields, rather than for the realities of internal war in the Philippines. President Marcos had to exhort the school heads to reexamine their curricula and to question if the AFP school missions and curricula were oriented, not so much to the "management of violence," but more towards the resolution of internal conflicts in the Philippines. It took several years before the President's exhortations and the realities of our internal wars finally awoke the school heads to reorient their curricula to the main threats to Philippine national security.

Such had been the power that the misorienting influences had over our education and training from the 1900s to the 1980s.

Once again, as we watch the growing power of the Soviet forces, there may be the temptations to return to concepts that parallel the "policy of containment" of the 1950s, to forget the first COMINTERN Conference in Baku in 1921, and to overlook the fact that the greatest Communist gains were made not through conventional wars but through destabilization, subversion, and insurgency in Third World Nations. And so, to repeat, there is a real danger that management seminars like this, mobile training teams that teach First World military doctrines, and combined exercises together with First World forces equipped with sophisticated weapon systems, may enamor us with military education and training programs, policies, and techniques that shine with brilliance and precision, but which do not correspond to the realities that the graduates will face and be forced to deal with. This, apparently, has been our sobering experience in this 20th century.

And so as we discuss and exchange ideas about training management, policies, programs, and techniques, the crucial question should always be, what shall we teach?

Perhaps a little hindsight can help develop a lot of foresight. Allow me to quote a military aphorism that has been irrefutedly true for the past 2,500 years: The art of war is of vital importance to the state. It is a matter of life or death, a road either to safety or to ruin. Hence, it is a subject which can, on no account, be neglected.

And, gentlemen, the relevant education and training of military forces has always been a part of the art of war.

Thank you.

PACIFIC ARMIES MANAGEMENT SEMINAR V

17 NOVEMBER 1981

MANILA, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

TRAINING MANAGEMENT IN THE U.S. ARMY

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JULIUS W. BECTON
DEPUTY COMMANDING GENERAL
US ARMY TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND

FEATURED SPEAKER

TRAINING MANAGEMENT IN THE U.S. ARMY

I am the Deputy Commander for Training of the US Army's Training and Doctrine Command and also the US Army Inspector of Training. Both of these positions are new in our Army and they were created by our Chief of Staff, which clearly demonstrates his concern for training.

As the Deputy Commander for Training, I'm responsible for the entire array of enlisted training from initial entry training to the Sergeants Major Academy, training support, individual training, and collective training.

As the Army Inspector of Training, I report directly to the Chief of Staff of the Army on the extent to which his policies and guidance are understood and followed throughout the total Army, and whether standardized practices are being used in individual and collective training.

I have been in my present position for approximately four months, but have been involved with training and training management during my entire career as a soldier. Hence, I consider good training management necessary to achieving the goals of combat-ready and combat-effective units.

In my talk today, I will take a top-down approach, starting with a brief discussion of training management as a total system, and then working down to the process of managing training at specific unit levels.

Effective training is not something that simply happens of its own accord. It does not occur in a vacuum. Rather, it is the end result of a detailed analysis and decision-making process that covers the following points: force structure, threat, combat developments, organization TOE's, doctrine, and structure.

First, the threat must be clearly identified and decisions made about the size and structure of the forces needed to overcome the threat. Also, doctrine must be developed and published to answer the question: "How are we going to fight and support?" The force structure must be further broken down into specific types of units, each with its own table of organization and equipment. In other words, we decide that we need so many infantry battalions with a certain type and quantity of equipment, and so many support type battalions with that type of equipment. Because of this, agencies for combat developments must work continually to make sure that doctrine and unit tables of organization and equipment will reflect and align with new weapons and weapons systems being developed to meet the changing threat. Of course, the results of this process will vary from one country's armed forces to another's; but I believe there is a universal need for an analysis similar to this one.

Once it had decided on the correct force structure and organization, the U.S. Army then concluded that the next essential step was to determine exactly what various units must be able to do in order to accomplish their missions, and also exactly what the individual soldier must be able to do to be proficient in his or her particular skill (and can contribute to accomplishing the unit mission). These two requirements call for collective and individual training, as defined here:

Individual: The training of ONE soldier to perform specific tasks.

Collective: The training of a group of soldiers to perform as a team
(Squad, Platoon, Company)

The training and training management system that we now use in the U.S. Army is based on Army Training and Evaluation Programs (ARTEP) to assist units in their collective training programs. The U.S. Army has developed specific ARTEPS for almost every type of unit in the Army. The ARTEP has three major purposes:

a. The ARTEP is a training and evaluation program which prescribes the missions and collective tasks a unit must perform to accomplish its wartime mission.

b. For the trainer and evaluator, the ARTEP provides the tasks, combat conditions, minimum standards, and training support requirements that help in conducting performance oriented training and evaluation.

c. For the commander, the ARTEP is a tool that will help him assess training proficiency, establish training objectives, and program resources.

In developing any ARTEP, the standards a unit must meet are critical. These standards should be measurable, they should call for specific procedures, and be worded in short, clear phrases. Here is a sample ARTEP training and evaluation outline for a 4.2 Mortar Platoon:

<u>TASK</u>	<u>CONDITION</u>	<u>STANDARD</u>
Occupy primary position	During daylight position previously reconnoitered by platoon leader	Prepare to fire within 7 minutes after arrival (all squads ready to fire)

Every 4.2 Mortar Platoon in the U.S. Army must be able to meet the standard in the right column in order to get a satisfactory rating for the task of occupying a primary position.

ARTEPS also list the critical missions for each type of unit. Here, for example, is a list of what we consider to be critical missions for a mechanized company: movement to contact; hasty attack; deliberate attack; night attack; defense; delay; prepare strongpoint; disengage under pressure; and defense of a built-up area.

As a complementary action, the U.S. Army has produced soldiers manuals for each military specialty so that both the individual soldier and the commanders and training managers will understand the tasks that soldiers must know and be able to do. The soldiers manual is the basic reference document for each soldier in the Army. It describes all the critical skills he must master to be proficient at his/her skill level. Here is an example of a soldiers manual task statement, with conditions, standards and performance measures:

TASK

091-503-1001

Maintain Protective Mask and Accessories

CONDITIONS: Given an ABC-M17A1 protective mask with accessories and items authorized to be stored in the carrier (per unit SOP), a pail of soapy water, a pail of clear water, several rags, a small brush, a dry lint-free cloth, and TM 3-4240-279-10.

STANDARDS: Within 15 minutes:

1. Make a visual inspection of mask, accessories, and authorized items and note all discrepancies, correcting those not requiring higher-echelon support.
2. Using procedures outlined in TM 3-4240-279-10, mask and carrier will be free of dirt, sand, and grit.

PERFORMANCE MEASURES

1. Inspecting mask and carrier.
 - a. Remove the mask from the carrier and check to insure that only authorized items are stored in the carrier.
 - b. Check the carrier for superficial dirt, mildew, rips, torn straps, and missing hardware.
 - c. Check the facepiece for holes, tears, splits, and signs of deterioration of rubber parts.
 - d. Check the filter elements to make sure that they are serviceable and properly installed.
 - e. Check the head harness for dirt and mildew; worn, frayed, or broken straps; and missing clinch tips.

After determining what units and individual soldiers must be able to do, we then developed training products, e.g., literature, devices, skill qualification tests, training guides, simulations, etc., designed to support both individual and collective training and to make training more effective and cost efficient.

But even when we had done all these things--analyzed force structure and doctrine and aligned them with weapons development; determined what units and

individual soldiers must know and do; and created materials to support their training--we still found ourselves in a situation where the three actions remained separate, not linked by any central regulating mechanism. To meet this obvious need for a central directive mechanism, we developed doctrine and methods for training management and also, as a natural consequence of training management, a guide which shows how to conduct training.

The central theme of training management in the U.S. Army today is centralized planning and decentralized execution. The underlying reason for this approach is the need to train as we perceive we will have to fight in any future war. Here I want to say something about the centralized planning aspects. They consist of three phases which we call long-range planning, short-range planning, and near-term planning. Various echelons do each of these phases with some overlapping. Long-range planning is done by Corps, Divisions, Brigades, and Battalions and involve these actions:

LONG-RANGE PLANNING

<u>QUESTIONS</u>	<u>ACTIONS</u>
1. What must the unit be able to do?	1. Identify/update unit missions 2. Prioritize missions 3. Draft goals
2. What can the unit do now?	4. Determine unit status 5. Analyze performance 6. Assess training environment
3. How can shortfalls be corrected and command goals accomplished?	7. Update training priorities 8. Review the current training program 9. Develop projections for external requirements and missions 10. Develop a concept for a new training program 11. Prepare long-range planning calendar and issue guidance

These actions are done in sequence and should project at least 18 months ahead. This means that Corps should project first, then Division, then Brigade, and finally Battalion. The entire long-range planning process revolves around the three basic questions listed above and the corresponding actions that determine the answers to these questions. While the long-range plan is being made, all its elements must be compared with the available resources listed below to insure that the plan can be executed.

Funds	Spare Parts	Time
Fuels	Aids/Devices	Facilities
Flying Hours	Publications	Personnel
Ammunition	Equipment	

As we come nearer to the actual conduct of training, the need to sharpen our focus and be more specific becomes evident. The short-range plan is designed to do this. The short-range plan usually considers the next three to four months of a Unit's training program, and is prepared only at Battalion level. Normally, the short-range planning process consists of these six actions: review the training program; consider the current unit status; draft a short-range planning calendar; identify and develop Battalion training objectives; determine appropriate training; and assign training and training management responsibilities.

As with long-range planning, making sure that the right types and quantities of resources will be available to support training is a very important part of short-range planning that has these features:

Funds	Facilities	Personnel
Fuels	Flying Hours	Aids/Devices
Ammunition	Equipment	Publications

The training objective, training guidance, and resource allocations that result from long-range and short-range planning are the basis for near-term planning. Near-term planning is the necessary last phase in the planning process which links training managers with the actual trainer in units. Battalions and their subordinate units are the primary near term planners. These echelons make near term plans in order to convert the Battalion long-range and short-range plans into training activities that will happen three or four weeks ahead. Near term planning results in the unit training schedule, which is the first written directive that dictates the actual conduct of training. The unit training schedule should include the following points: what mission/task is to be trained; when and where training is to begin; who is to conduct and who is to be trained; leader training and multiechelon training; allocation of limited resources equitably; and information the trainer needs to prepare training.

An effective total planning process: long-range, short-range, and near term, which projects out as far as possible and maintains the maximum possible stability, opens the way for quality training to happen at the unit level.

Current U.S. Army training doctrine at unit level dictates that quality training must have certain principles. For example, it must be performance oriented, decentralized, multiechelon, realistic, and standardized. In addition, quality training must also have these characteristics: it is technically and tactically correct; it is conducted by the soldier's leader (this requirement strengthens the leader's authority and increases his knowledge of his soldiers, and at the same time it advances his professional development as a soldier); it addresses the known weaknesses of soldiers and units; it addresses the basics first. This means three things: first, soldiers must show proficiency on their individual tasks before collective tasks are trained; and second, more complexity and realism are added to training only when soldiers and units are ready to profit from them; and finally, it causes soldiers and units to retain their skills. It does this through practice at regular intervals, proper sequencing, variety, proper resourcing, and team building.

The entire process of planning and conducting training also requires continuous evaluation at all levels in order to evaluate performance, provide feedback up the chain of command so that higher headquarters can determine how effectively and efficiently both training managers and trainers are doing their jobs in terms of the results of training, and establish accountability at each level of training management.

I have described training management from individual through various levels of collective training, and now would like to briefly describe our newest, most innovative training and evaluation tool, the National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin in the California high desert. As military leaders, our goal is to build and sustain proficiency in our forces, which assures survival and mission accomplishment in the lethal environment of combat. This requires us to provide: 1) a realistic environment in which to train, and 2) feedback to commanders that assists them in developing training remedies for performance deficiencies. At the NTC, we will provide to Battalion Commanders the opportunity to control full sized combined arms task forces in a near combat environment, during live fire exercises, and force on force engagement simulation. The training will be enriched by the presence of an opposing force, that resembles a motorized rifle regiment, to take the adversary role within the carefully designed mission scenarios.

A key feature of the NTC will be our force on force, "MILES" based engagement simulation. MILES, which is short for Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System, is an eye-safe laser emitter which has been developed for most of our direct fire weapons. Associated with the "light gun" is a set of light detectors worn by individual soldiers and placed on vehicles. When the invisible light from the gun strikes the detectors, the individual or vehicle crew is alerted by the sound of a piercing buzzer. The buzzer also gives them information as to whether or not they were nearly hit, disabled, or killed. If the buzzer alerts the crew or individual soldier of a kill, the buzzer may be turned off, but this turns off all the weapon systems and that particular crew or soldier can no longer fire laser weapons. So, as you can see, it gives us a close approximation of casualties on the battlefield. That is, the light from the laser device strikes soldiers and vehicles and like the rounds from the real weapon, disables the target. At NTC we have connected the MILES equipment to a transmitter that sends the information about the weapon system to include engagements and hits to a central computer along with the position location of that weapon. The purpose of the instrumentation system is to provide a mechanism for critique of training and feedback to the commander. Information from the laser battle is transmitted to a central computer and the information is stored so that training analysts can review it and help the commander make judgments on the performance of his Battalion. Further, we hope to be able to help him develop training plans to remedy problems, both at Fort Irwin and at the commander's home station.

I mentioned briefly the opposing force. This "Regiment" is composed of two permanently assigned battalions equipped with vehicles that appear to be Warsaw Pact combat vehicles. These vehicles were developed by placing fiberglass overbodies on top of reconnaissance vehicles and appear very realistic. The

intensity of the battles at the NTC is increased by the integration of nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) and electronic warfare. We hope to portray combat reality in every detail, to include full power radio jamming, target detection, and network monitoring in a hostile NBC environment.

We are optimistic that the NTC will provide commanders the opportunity to exercise their entire unit without the constraints of home station, as well as assist them in analyzing their unit's performance, designing training, and integrating that training into the long-range training plans at home station.

For the subordinate units, it provides a rare opportunity to practice soldiers' skills in a near combat environment in the hopes of learning combat lessons in bloodless combat.

I realize that I have given you a great deal of information in a very short time. I hope I have at least presented an adequate outline of this critical topic of training management and provided some ideas that may help you in your training effort. Thank you for your time and attention.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS (LTG BECTON)

Q. What percentage of the total Army budget is devoted to training?

A. (LTG Forrester) Sixty percent of the budget is allocated against personnel costs, and Basic Combat Training constitutes one-third of these personnel costs. About 20% of the budget is devoted to direct and indirect training costs. Thus, the total figure for training amounts to about 40% of the overall army budget.

Q. How much time do you devote to individual training and how much time do you devote to collective training?

A. Individual training depends upon the soldier's specialty; it may range from 5 to 45 weeks. Collective training is conducted continuously.

Q. How do your Combat Service Support (CSS) units train?

A. Let me use transporters as an example. A truck driver hauling a load is actually training in his specialty. By extension, a truck platoon or company doing unit hauling is conducting collective training even though they may be hauling in support of a completely unrelated activity. The tactical training of CSS units is more difficult, but they are also allocated time in the field in all training schedules to accomplish this training.

Q. ARTEPS for deployed US Forces: To what extent are they conducted and to what extent are corrections made in place?

A. Whenever deployed units are in (or are close to) maneuver areas, ARTEPS can be conducted. Corrections are made on the ground during ARTEPS; however, this is only done when safety hazards exist or when "negative" training is being given.

A. (LTG Forrester) The Division Commander has the latitude to determine what portions of the ARTEP must be changed by environmental factors. So long as he can certify to the Department of the Army annually that the unit is satisfactory, he will have his own priorities.

A. On this subject, standardization of training is also significant. If a tank gunner knows the SQT requirements, he can be a tank gunner in any unit of the Army. Thus, whether a unit is physically in the US or is deployed abroad is not material to the SQT or ARTEP. The requirement will be the same wherever the testing is conducted, limited of course, by the environmental factors cited by General Forrester.

Q. To what extent do civilians participate in training? What is their role, what courses do they effect, and what level of training do they undergo?

A. We use civilians from the lowest to the highest levels. We use them as contract cooks and kitchen police, instructors for specialized training, for "reinforcer" training of lessons already mastered, for general high school

and college instruction, and as specialists at Service Staff schools. For most of them, their expertise is limited to the specific knowledge for which they were hired; therefore, we don't train them. Their credentials, however, are monitored by the training managers, the faculties which originally accredited them, and most specifically by the students themselves in the form of evaluations which provide us feedback on their performance.

Q. Do you hire civilians full time, as needed, or on a contractual basis?

A. "All of the above." It depends on what level of expertise is required, for how long, and whether we can eventually develop our own expertise.

Q. How does the US plan for use of the NTC, what type of planning is this: long, short, or near term?

A. All three types of planning are involved. There are 18, 24, and 36 month cycles but the planning is refined as the time becomes shorter. We've planned for its use through 1983 at TRADOC level; however, it is managed by Commander, Forces Command (FORSCOM) who is the training manager for the Army and NTC. TRADOC actually analyzes the training conducted.

Q. Is training only conducted at battalion level or are brigades, divisions, and corps also trained at NTC?

A. NTC is geared for battalion level training. Divisions and corps train through exercises such as Reforger.

Q. Why don't battalions train in divisional areas instead of displacing to the NTC? That would seem to be more cost effective.

A. We plan to train all battalions once within an eighteen month cycle. We do this because money for training is not the sole parameter for divisions. A standardized environment is beyond most divisional budgets. Additionally, the ability to standardize environments, especially on the East Coast, is out of the question.

Q. Are Army doctrine and concepts integrated with those of the other services?

A. Yes. There are groups at all levels working at integrating doctrine and tactics. JCS and the Unified Commands also play a role. A good example of this is the Army and Air Force dual role against armor, where our training is fully integrated.

Q. Does TRADOC train reservists?

A. Yes, we train all elements. But, in point of fact, TRADOC doesn't really conduct the training. We develop doctrine. Commanders train. That is essential to understanding the system.

Q. For reservists, what differences are there in doctrine?

A. None. FORSCOM trains and TRADOC develops doctrine for all forces.

Q. Is there a prescribed training program for counterinsurgency (CI) and counter revolutionary warfare (CRW) and what is its length?

A. Yes, there is. At Ft Bragg, individual level training is conducted and these graduates, in turn, train in their own units. Aspects of training required vary the length of this training. For example: VII Corps receives minimal CI and CRW training, as this is not important in the European environment. Elsewhere, other commands place greater emphasis on this subject matter.

Q. But CI and CRW training are not provided to all units?

A. No, not as unit training.

A. (LTG Forrester) All units have a specific mission. All units train against that mission and the mission determines wartime requirements for CI capabilities.

Q. ARTEP measures efficiency and its results are reported up the chain of command. Isn't that a test, per se?

A. No. Commanders must assess their units' status monthly. ARTEPS are annual and are merely evaluation tools. They tell commanders to practice more in certain areas and, where they have done well in others, to apply less emphasis.

A. (LTG Forrester) The philosophy of ARTEP is important here: personalities of division commanders do get in the way and each has a different attitude as to what is important and what is not. In the final analysis, the personality of the division commander can greatly influence emphasis in ARTEPS.

PACIFIC ARMIES MANAGEMENT SEMINAR - V

19 NOVEMBER 1981

MANILA, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

FEATURED GUEST ADDRESS

MAJOR GENERAL PARK CHUN SIK
COMMANDER, FIRST LOGISTICS SUPPORT COMMAND
REPUBLIC OF KOREA ARMY

MILITARY FORCES AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF KOREA

It is a great honor and privilege for me to be with you today to discuss problems of mutual interest at this management seminar. Over 100 years ago, the first Korean ambassador to the United States received a tremendous round of applause after delivering, in his best English, a speech at a welcoming reception. However, later in the evening, one gentleman approached the beaming ambassador and said, "Mr. Ambassador, in spite of the great distance between our countries, I am surprised to learn of the great similarity between the Korean language and the American language." To prevent the same misunderstanding from happening to me, I want to let you know from the outset, that I am doing my best to speak English, not Korean.

As the postwar economic development of West Germany was referred to as "the miracle of the Rhine River," the economic development of Korea is now being called "the miracle of the Han River."

Gentlemen. By anyone's standards, the economic growth in Korea over the past 20 years has been truly remarkable. During this period our per capita income has increased 340 percent; our gross national product has risen 500 percent; and the dollar value of products exported has risen an astonishing 4,500 percent.

The past 10 years have seen the skyline of our cities change dramatically, with the development of large department stores, high rise apartment complexes, and skyscrapers; the development of large industrial complexes, such as the Pohang steel plant, which is one of the largest in the free world; the development of our rural farm areas, through government subsidized housing and farm machinery; and the introduction of a modern highway network and wide boulevards in our cities. This rapid progress has introduced us to those unique pleasures, common to all developed nations, such as the morning and afternoon "rush hour" traffic jams.

Although the primary mission of the armed forces is to win the battle and emerge victorious in war, there is a secondary role for the military in a rapidly developing nation such as Korea. The military can and must play an important leadership role in this national development project. What I want to discuss with you is this secondary role of the military, or to be more specific, the role the Korean military forces has played in the national development of Korea. There is an old oriental proverb that goes like this: "One who expects a harvest in a year, plants seedlings. One who expects fruit in a decade, plants a tree. And one who expects to prosper in a century, educates promising youth."

Much of what I am going to tell you concerning contributions which the military forces have made to the development of Korea falls into the area of educating or investing in the youth of our nation. Few of us would disagree that the most valuable resource that a developing nation may possess is a resourceful, determined people. Resourcefulness and determination to succeed

can be enhanced through education and training. Although this is best achieved by coordinating and maintaining a consistency between the education received at home, in public schools and in our social environment, it is difficult to do. However, in Korea, all healthy males over 19 years of age must serve 30 months in the military, giving the military the opportunity to provide a common education for its junior citizens. During service life--away from home, school, and boyhood friends--our young soldiers become mature and selfreliant. During daily activities, the young soldier develops an understanding of his fellow countrymen, respect for authority, and loyalty to his country. During this critical period in a young man's development, I believe the military serves as a melting pot between the "haves" and "have nots," promoting understanding, cooperation, and the national unity to resist and persevere against the common threat of the North Korean Communists.

From 1949 to 1975, our military forces educated over 11,000 soldiers abroad. Although initial emphasis was on basic military schooling such as the Officer's Basic Course, during the seventies emphasis was changed to advanced technical training. This change was precipitated by recognition of the fact that national production is a function of four basic economic variables: capital, labor, natural resources and technology. As Korea was short of both natural resources and production capital, it was considered essential that we place primary emphasis on the development and effective use of our labor force and the introduction of modern technology if economic development was to be accelerated. Again, the military was a natural training ground. Because of its size, the military constitutes a state within the state, with men trained to fill the various administrative and managerial posts within the military institution. The military maintains a variety of training institutions, for both officers and enlisted men, to fill these positions. Today our Army operates 16 technical schools, teaching over 220 technical courses. Many of the technical skills our young enlisted men receive have direct applications in the civilian sector.

In fact, a recent study by our Korean Military Academy revealed that about 50 percent of the military occupational specialties can be utilized in the civilian sector. A survey of recently discharged soldiers indicated that 26 percent were using the skills and knowledge received in military training in their current civilian jobs. Thus, as our draftees complete their 30 months of mandatory service, many are being returned to the civilian sector with usable technical skills. These men have gained experience in the use and maintenance of modern equipment. The Korean Army is returning about 200,000 of such young men to the civilian sector each year.

My next point deals with contributions the military has made in the area of introducing modern management techniques and organizational theories to our country. As the outflow of enlisted personnel provides the civilian sector with a pool of highly skilled technicians, the annual outflow of military officers provides the civilian sector with a pool of middle level managers and senior executives. Korean officers receive considerable management and organizational training in various military schools, both domestic and abroad. As

officers move from lower level units to high level staffs, they acquire practical experience in decision making and in leading goal oriented organizations. During their tour of duty, officers are exposed to scientific planning, work efficiency and effectiveness, control and measurement, record keeping and how to brief. They learn to assume responsibility and to be accountable for their actions. They develop a strong sense of duty and honor. The military access to international communications and its role as the defender of national interests makes its officers a highly nationalistic group. As these officers are discharged, upon completing their service obligation or through retirement, they continue to serve their country by assuming management and leadership positions in both governmental agencies and in the private sector. Having been exposed to western management techniques and organizational theories, they were aware of the types of technical skills needed to implement a modern administrative system. Thanks primarily to their efforts, modern administrative systems have spread through both our public and private organizations.

In addition to providing the civilian sector with personnel having technical and managerial skills, the Korean military complements major government programs such as the Saemaul movement or new village movement program. The Saemaul movement was undertaken by our government to stop the gradual movement of our people from rural farm areas into larger cities and industrial centers. Of course the cities and industrial centers were the first locations to experience an increase in standard of living and cultural enrichment as a result of our industrial growth. The Saemaul movement includes government subsidized housing and farm machinery, but strives to achieve much broader objectives. Essentially the program promises a better life through increased incomes derived from diligence, self-reliance and cooperation. In my opinion, military team training, ranger training and airborne training help develop individuals with the strength of character, diligence and attitudes required to sustain the success of the Saemaul movement. In addition, the armed forces gives special training to all young soldiers just prior to their discharge, on the goals and requirements of the Saemaul movement, as well as on how to serve as a leader of the program in villages and towns.

My final point deals with contributions the armed forces have made to national development through what is commonly called civic action programs. "Civic action" denotes utilization of military units in activities such as agriculture, construction, public education, public health and the like, which fall outside the primary mission of the armed forces and into spheres normally considered the province of the civilian instrumentalities of government. Under this program, Korean soldiers have assisted farmers in rice planting and harvesting; they have built dams, roads, and schools; they have distributed food, medical supplies, machines and equipment to needy civilians; and they have entertained, educated and provided villagers with medical treatment. In addition to contributing to national development, such visible community actions enhance the view of our military in the eyes of our civilian citizens and help foster an image of the military as being "an Army of the people." At Gettysburg, Abraham Lincoln restated the fundamentals on which democratic

governments are founded, "Government of the people, by the people, and for the people." In Korea, we have extended this principle to our military forces. The Korean military code refers to our military forces as "the military of the people."

Hopefully, my little talk has pointed out how our military forces have attempted to live up to this charter by assuming a leadership role in national development. During the past few minutes, I have attempted to point out some of the more important ways I think the Korean military has contributed to national development. To summarize, I believe the military forces have led the way in technological training, returning to the civilian sector, not only as highly skilled technicians but also as skilled managers and leaders, as well. The military has complemented government programs such as the Saemaul movement, through information and education programs. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the military has worked side by side with our civilian citizens building roads and ports, assisting in times of natural disasters and planting rice in the fields. I do see a change in the scope of the military as a leader of Korea's technological advance in the future. I believe the military leadership role will take a narrower front and concentrate on those technologies of special interest to the military. Over time, the skills and technological know-how in the civilian sector have surpassed those of the military in many fields. Thus I see the military concentrating on research and development and such technological fields as computer science and electronics, since both technologies hold great promise for the military.

A favorite motto in Korean society is "better life." "Better life" refers not only to a more affluent society, but also to the realization of a "righteous society," where all members possess equitable benefits. If we achieve the "better life," there can be no intrusion from the North Korean Communists. Our military must remain superior to that of the North and our nation must continue to build national power through industrialization. Gentlemen, I assure you, we Koreans will do our part to promote fraternal relationships among all Pacific nations, to establish a framework for world peace, and to improve the welfare of all mankind. My hope is for permanent peace and prosperity for all. Thank you very much.

Questions and Answers after MG Park's Presentation

Q. I am interested in the Korean Army's program for the 200,000 soldiers you turn out to the civilian sector. How do you help them?

A. As I stated before, all civilian manufacturers desire to have discharged soldiers. Our survey showed they are so disciplined, diligent, and so strong in their sense of service, in addition to their skills and management ability, that industry is very glad to get them. On the other hand, the government gives its support in placing technicians. Frankly speaking, we had a lack of qualified people nationally, so that was relatively easy. Now we are facing the fact that all young discharged soldiers may not be able to get immediate jobs. The government is working on this.

Q. After discharge from government service, do you still use ex-soldiers to support operational requirements of the armed forces?

A. After discharge, all ex-regulars belong to reserve forces and there is a tremendous number, about four million, of these to protect their villages and industries. Everyone has this obligation until age 33, mobilized reserve forces until 30, and after that, the general reserve forces for rear area protection roles for the next 3 years.

Q. Do you use civilians in their day-to-day roles and do they perform service to the Army?

A. Very few regular forces are in the rear areas; most of our forces are forward. North Korea tries to penetrate our rear areas regularly, so civilians do accomplish some of that security work.

Q. You have an excellent program for military skills training. What is your program for building patriotism, fidelity, and arming soldiers against propaganda from the North?

A. All training is for a short time. We do draw on their early civilian training and schooling, but in the military, we use psychological and spiritual training, a mental and spiritual education. For Western powers, this spiritual aspect of training has been deemphasized, but we are developing this element of our national character through troop information and education, stressing the will to fight, not only in the military, but also in the civilian community from elementary school through college. In addition, we Koreans are proud of our country and believe it to be the first-rate anti-Communist power in the world. This conviction sustains us. We give anti-Communism our best training, but the finest anti-Communist teacher was Kim Il-Sung himself. He taught us what Communism was and steeled us against it.

Q. Do special training groups conduct the spiritual and mental training?

A. Yes, we have those as well. The Army charter places the best officers as Troop Information and Education (TI&E) officers. The Commander is also charged with conducting this training and he is positioned to be the most effective trainer. There is a Spiritual Power School for all commanders and TI&E officers.

Q. I have read your history of development. In our history of planning, we have difficulty reaching the target goals of 5-year plans. There are bureaucratic problems which have thwarted 5-year program completion. Do you have these problems and how do you overcome them?

A. Everyone knows we've made great progress with several 5-year plans. Although this is true, we have encountered problems, but one of the reasons for our greater success is the greater level of education among the Korean people. We have a saying in Korea which I cited earlier. We rely most heavily upon education for nation building. Moreover, these economic development plans were formulated by those educated abroad and familiar with others' 5-year plans and their faults. Another factor is that economic development is a life or death problem with us; we must have it and it is supported by all of the people with a strong will to make it succeed. The 5-year plans have been successful so far and we haven't encountered too many problems.

Q. The civilian system has so much feedback, where the military is more directive. Your civilian directives seem to flow so much faster than in most other countries. Was this system originally there in the civilian sector or how did you develop it? How do you get feedback?

A. Second question first. Although we haven't had any great communications problem, one of our problems can be identified as the weakening of traditional values. Another is the rapid growth of the industrial system, which makes the present society so materialistic. Our urbanization creates population problems and our national debt is large. Through program feedback, we are solving several of these national problems quite well. For example, with the Saemaul movement, we are distributing the population around the cities. And we will repay our debts on schedule.

As to the first question, we don't have any problem with getting directives down. Our whole people are determined to defend the country, so it's easy to get directives passed quickly and our bureaucracy is streamlined to do this, as well as most cooperative and determined to assist.

PACIFIC ARMIES MANAGEMENT SEMINAR V
16-20 November 1981
Manila, Republic of the Philippines

LIST OF PRESENTATIONS*

OPENING REMARKS:

"Welcoming Remarks"	LTG Forrester, Commander, US Army Western Command
"Welcoming Remarks"	MG Ramas, Commanding General, Philippine Army

GEOPOLITICAL AND STRATEGIC ASSESSMENTS:

"Presidential Remarks"	President Marcos, Republic of the Philippines
"Asia-Pacific Strategic Assessment"	Admiral Long, US Navy, Commander in Chief, US Pacific Command

KEYNOTE ADDRESS:

"Training Management in the Armed Forces of the Philippines: Policies and Guidelines"	GEN Ver, Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines
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HOST ARMY GUEST SPEAKER:

"Military Education and Training - The Philippine Experiences"	BG Agunod, Commandant, AFP, CGSC
"Training Management in the United States Army"	LTG Becton, Deputy Commander for Training, US Army Training and Doctrine Command

FEATURED GUEST SPEAKER:

"Military Forces and the Development of Korea"	MG Park, Commander, 1st Logistics Support Command, Korean Army
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PRESENTATIONS: POLICY, CONCEPTS, AND DOCTRINE:

"Training Systems Management in the Indonesian Army"	COL Hardy Hardiatin Indonesian Army
"Centralized Versus Decentralized Training"	COL Y. R. M. P. Wijekoon and MAJ W. M. P. Fernando Sri Lanka Army

*The complete manuscripts are published separately as the Addendum to the
Final Report.

"Centralized Versus Decentralized Training Management"	MAJ Tupou and LT Ma'afu Tonga Defense Services
"Malaysian Army Training Management System"	COL Mohamed Bin Munip Malaysian Army
"Training Management in the Singapore Armed Forces"	COL Ha, MAJ Yong, and MAJ Tan Singapore Armed Forces
"Army Unit Training"	COL Kim and MAJ Shin Republic of Korea Army

PRESENTATIONS: TRAINING METHODS AND TECHNIQUES:

"Battlefield Simulations"	COL Fowler, US Army
"Management of Shooting in the New Zealand Army"	LTC Finnimore and MAJ Hall New Zealand Army

PRESENTATIONS: TRAINING PLANS AND PROGRAMS:

"Civil Relations Training"	COL Herminio Salas Philippine Army
"Training Plans and Programs"	LTC Mohammed Mohsin Bangladesh Army
"Concepts of Small Unit Training"	SP COL Thawan Sawaengpan Royal Thai Army
"Noncommissioned Officer Training"	LTC Soma and LTC Josiah Papua New Guinea Defence Force

PRESENTATIONS: SPECIAL SUBJECTS:

"Training Aspects of Force Expansion and Mobilization"	COL Healy, Australian Army
"US Army Reserve Components and Training Management"	COL Bush, US Army
"Interoperability of the Pacific Armies' Communications Systems"	COL Botts, US Army

CLOSING REMARKS:

LTG Forrester, US Army

MG Ramas, Philippine Army

PACIFIC ARMIES MANAGEMENT SEMINAR V
16-20 November 1981
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PANEL ASSIGNMENTS

Panel 1

*COL MUHAMMAD Bin Munip
COL Jose ALCANESES
COL John B. HEALY
COL Benjamin N. SANTOS
LTC Hugh BAKER
LTC Fred N. HALLEY
LTC Mohammed MOHSIN
LTC John D. PARSONS
**LTC Ted K. YAMASHITA
MAJ W. M. P. FERNANDO
MAJ William E. DOCK
LT Siosaia L. MA'AFU

Panel 3

*SP COL HAWAN Sawaengpan
COL Emory BUSH
COL HARDY Hartiatin
COL Feliciano SUAREZ
LTC Eduardo M. FERNANDEZ
LTC Edward T. FINNIMORE
LTC Anthony NORMAND
**LTC Joe L. BUTCHER
MAJ Hercules CATALUNA
MAJ ENAYET Hussain
MAJ SHIN IJ Soon
MAJ TAN Khin Poh

Panel 5

*COL RADIYON Mustofa
COL Restituto PADILLA
LTC Alfonso CAGURANGAN
LTC Jack JONES
LTC KIM Jong Seob
LTC Ponciano MILLENA
LTC Sitiveni RABUKA
**LTC Charles ROTHLSBERGER
MAJ Fetu'utolu TUPOU
MAJ YONG Chong Kong
CPT Steven PHILBRICK

Panel 2

*COL HA Weng Kong
COL ABINOWO Mukmin
COL David R. ABUNDO, Jr.
COL Gloterio DOLORFINO
COL Edward HIRATA
COL George D. IRVINE
COL Lorenzo RAFAMAN
COL CHALERMCHAI Hiranard
COL Richard M. ADAMS
**LTC Martin FREY
LTC David JOSIAH
Wing Comdr Syed Farhat Ahmad ROOMY

Panel 4

*COL Y. R. M. P. WIJEKON
COL Melvin ALLENCASTRE
COL Isagani DELOS SANTOS
COL Ruperto AMBIL
COL KIM Jong Kyong
COL PISIT Ditsayabut
CMDR Andre BAUDSON
**LTC Ronald TURNER
LTC Paul SOMA
MAJ Frederick DREW
MAJ Brian HALL
MAJ Robert HAYNER

Roving Panel Members

MG Saiyid Fahim Haider RIZVI
BG Alfonso TRANCE
BG Muhammad ASHRAF

* Panel Leader
** Panel Recorder

PACIFIC ARMIES MANAGEMENT SEMINAR V

16-20 NOVEMBER 1981

MANILA, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

PANEL REPORTS

PREFACE

Prior to the convocation of the seminar, each panel participant was issued a summary of the US Army training system and a list of questions and issues relevant to each of the discussion areas: Concepts and Policies, Plans and Programs, and Methods and Techniques. These were designed to stimulate thought and focus panel discussions; however, panel leaders were authorized to omit, modify, or add questions and issues as they deemed such action appropriate to their panel's interests. This report includes the US Army Training System summary, the questions and issues preceding each of the discussion areas, and a summary of panel discussions and reports made to the plenary sessions which addresses these questions and issues. Both majority and minority views are presented, but there is no attribution to any particular country or panel.

THE US ARMY TRAINING SYSTEM

The US Army's training system is designed to provide commanders with everything they require to prepare their units for combat and to sustain combat readiness, starting with basic combat training for individual soldiers and culminating in unit field exercises that simulate actual warfare. The system provides for training doctrine, individual and collective training in schools and units, advanced training keyed to soldiers' career progression and a wide range of training resources. A major responsibility of battalion and company commanders is to manage aspects of the Army's training system that supports the training of their soldiers and units.

The components of the Army training system are individual training, unit training, and training support. This system trains soldiers in Soldier's Manual and Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP) skills, evaluates individual and unit proficiency to perform missions, and supports training by providing the required resources.

Individual training is training which the officer, NCO, or soldier receives in institutions, units, on-the-job, or by self-study. This training prepares the individual soldier to perform specific duties or tasks related to the assigned or next higher specialty code or MOS skill level and duty position. Individual training conducted as part of a unit's training program sustains the skills presented in the training base environment and teaches the soldier those individual skills not previously taught. Among the many management challenges of individual training are proper soldier placement and the need to conduct more effective and efficient training in the training base and unit environment.

Unit training consists of performance-oriented individual and collective training and focuses on preparing the unit to accomplish its contingency and wartime missions. Because of resource constraints in the training base, every unit's training program includes individual training conducted as concurrent and reinforcement training, which builds on earlier training. Individual and collective training conducted at the unit level are performance-oriented and require individual soldiers to demonstrate proficiency of the tasks they are expected to do, not what they know. Collective training is conducted the way the unit will fight. Performance-oriented training uses short demonstrations and "learning by doing" as the primary means of instruction. Training centers on training objectives that state clearly and directly what is to be done, under what conditions, and how well it is to be done (standards). The training is paced to the needs of soldiers or units and is not time-oriented, and concludes with a performance test which is identical to the training objective. To state this concept in another way, "methods of instruction" are no longer of primary importance; the key issue is whether or not soldiers and units can actually perform the tasks as they should be done.

This also means that training is decentralized. This factor applies to individual training, which is "Sergeant's business," and to collective

training. The squad/crew/section leader is charged with responsibilities of conducting the individual training of soldiers. There are exceptions. For example, low-density MOS training may have to be conducted centrally. Also, in advanced collective training which is resource intensive, a lower unit is often being trained by a leader or commander.

The Soldier's Manual is the basic training manual which contains those individual tasks the soldier is required to perform in the applicable occupational specialty. After the soldier demonstrates knowledge or lack of knowledge of the task, the information is recorded in the supervisor's job book which provides the supervisor with future training requirements. Annual skill qualification tests demonstrate the soldier's skill knowledge and potential for promotion. Training managers can use these results to check how effective individual training has been and to program future training. The challenge faced by training managers is how to integrate individual training with collective training while making the best possible use of available training resources.

The objective of collective training is to train and develop cohesive teams and units which are capable of accomplishing their combined arms missions. Training managers determine training priorities and establish training programs which accomplish this objective. Training programs are established after analyzing individual and unit capabilities required to accomplish their missions. Training requirements are identified, training objectives determined, and training resources identified and allocated. During its conduct, training is monitored and evaluated, and required revisions are made to future training programs. The training manager's challenge is to develop a training program which sustains unit proficiency at a continuous level, rather than allowing proficiency in peaks and valleys caused by cyclic training and evaluation schedules. ARTEP exercises, field training exercises, live-fire exercises, and Emergency Deployment Readiness Exercises are examples of collective training which contribute to training proficiency and provide evaluation and feedback for future training needs.

The Battalion Training Management System (BTMS) provides an effective vehicle to assist training managers in conducting quality training. This system trains officers and NCO's how to plan, conduct, and evaluate training in their units. Workshops are presented to first-line trainers (squad, team, section), platoon trainers (platoon leader and sergeants), supervisors (CSM and 1SG's), and managers (Bn/company level commanders and staff). The BTMS system provides the framework for planning, executing, standardizing, evaluating, and feedback of training.

Within units, the ARTEP provides the standard wartime missions required to be performed and is the basis for unit evaluations. The ARTEP manual is the basic training document used by training managers to establish and structure unit training programs. Annual ARTEP evaluation results assist the training managers in determining future objectives and programs. Scheduled for release to the field, the Training Management Control System (TMACS) is an automated system which will assist training managers in planning training, evaluating resource impacts, and recording training accomplished and resources that were used.

The final component of the Army Training System, training support, encompasses manuals, facilities, ammunition, training aids and devices and other resources necessary to conduct quality training. A host of these items presently exists to reinforce training performance. Because of budgetary constraints which affect training resources, optimal use of training support items must be stressed by training managers in order to improve training effectiveness. Long lead times in requesting and allocating training support items must be considered and planned for when developing training programs.

In summary, quality training is the key to soldier performance and combat effectiveness. As stated by the Chief of Staff of the Army in his White Paper, no task is more important than training, as we face the decade of the 80's. Leaders and training managers at every level must understand the present training system, avoid disruptive changes, and make the system work.

TOPIC 1: TRAINING CONCEPTS AND POLICIES

- A. What factors argue for centralized control? Decentralized control? Is there a certain size or student population that should be the determinant for centralization or decentralization?
- B. Should the availability of resources be the primary determinant of training policy or should postulated conflict requirements be the primary determinant?
- C. How can training be realistic and accurately evaluated during peacetime? Should the training evaluation be accorded greater significance than other factors (logistical, personnel, etc.) in the determination of unit readiness for combat?
- D. Considering the forecast that fossil fuels may no longer be available for internal combustion engines early in the 21st century, what policies and concepts ought to govern materiel acquisition, tactical doctrine, and training policies for the 21st century?

PANEL 1

1. What training policies should apply to a unit short of qualified key personnel or far below TOE strength?
2. How should training policies and concepts be tailored to cope with the phenomenon of personnel turbulence?

PANEL 2

1. How may general officers and senior officers influence training? How much should they supplement the directives of higher HQ through the issuance of their own guidance?
2. What criteria should be used to assign training responsibilities to commissioned officers? Noncommissioned officers?

PANEL 3

1. Should basic training be done centrally or within tactical units?
2. Where is the best place to teach leadership skills? Management skills? Technical skills?
3. How should the trainer be trained? How should his proficiency be maintained?

PANEL 4.

1. To what extent should officers, noncommissioned officers, and soldiers be required or permitted to specialize? What common training requirements should be satisfied by all military personnel?
2. Should officers, noncommissioned officers and soldiers demonstrate proficiency in required skills prior to being considered for promotion?
3. What special incentives should be used to reward leaders for their subordinates' training achievements?

PANEL 5

1. What role can be assigned the female soldier in order to achieve maximum effectiveness on tomorrow's battlefield? What training requirements may be derived from the postulated role?
2. How may the small unit leader more effectively influence training? Where, when, and with whom should he interact to exert the most profound influence?

SUMMARY OF DISCUSSIONS OF TOPIC 1

All panels elected to identify the key decision factors; determine their relevance at various echelons of policy formulation, supervision, and execution; and cite the advantage of centralization versus decentralization. Key decision factors included: (1) the force structure and its annual rhythm of personnel assignments; (2) resources: personnel, funds, equipment, facilities and time, available to accomplish the training; (3) the type and level of training proficiency dictated by the postulated operational mission(s); (4) geographic location of the training and site of operational unit deployments; (5) the chain of command to be used for planning and supervising training; (6) maintenance of standards; (7) the relationship between training and cohesion within operational units; (8) distribution of authority and responsibility needed to achieve flexibility, and optimize resource expenditures; (9) complexity of the training mission; should each individual and unit possess single or multiple capabilities at the conclusion of training; and (10) the correlation of individual and unit training goals and objectives.

Discussions produced the following conclusions and observations: (1) resource expenditures can be optimized by centralized policy formulation and planning, and decentralized execution; (2) decentralized execution enhances the focus on operational mission accomplishment and provides a sense of purpose to commanders and troops; (3) specialist training should be conducted centrally; (4) the "combined arms team" should be the fundamental structure for training and should resemble the combined arms team used for operational missions; (5) unit training should link combat, support, and service training

in a manner highlighting their interdependence; (6) policies should always provide for the introduction of innovative ideas; (7) realism is imperative, even if concomitant risks are high; and (8) there is no particular size or force composition that, taken alone, dictates either centralization or decentralization.

There was a consensus that mission oriented training was desired and that resources availability should be assessed to forecast needs, but not be allowed to become the primary determinant of policy. At the same time, it was conceded that absolute constraints had to be accepted in the design of programs and should, therefore, become the focus for innovative effort. Such innovation included the incorporation of resources and efforts of non-military agencies. It was also agreed that a realistic assessment should be made to determine how much training is needed to satisfy national needs.

Training evaluation proved to be a contentious issue with a majority opining that considerable latitude should be given to the commander responsible for mission execution, rather than adhering rigidly to numerical summation or to the periodic findings of experts from higher headquarters. Exhaustive evaluation is expensive and intimidating, and therefore, should be used sparingly. The tested unit should meet minimum personnel and equipment assignment standards before being eligible for evaluation. Since unit readiness demands total systems capability, all factors must be considered. Training offers the greatest and most economic means to improve effectiveness.

Few wanted to look into the 21st century when fossile fuel might be depleted. It was conceded that tactical doctrines and training methods would have to be modified drastically, and that a separate, thorough study effort is warranted, with interim efforts directed toward "common-sense" economy measures.

A shortage of qualified key personnel may warrant disbanding the unit or cessation of unit training until the unit achieves about 75% strength. Junior personnel should be challenged by advancement to more senior levels or assignment of responsibilities associated with those senior levels. Turbulence must be eliminated as a training distracter. This can be achieved by correlating personnel acquisition and training policies, conceding that acquisition may be the pacing factor.

Senior personnel should introduce their own experience, but only to amplify accepted policy guidelines established through objective study. NCO's were regarded as the "backbone" of training while officers were seen as educators.

Basic training within the unit of ultimate assignment was seen as desirable, in order that early identity and rapport be established and future peculiar specialist training requirements be identified. This policy enhances the conduct of leadership training and compels the improvement of management skills at all echelons. Trainers can be trained most effectively by returning them to operational units, realizing that specialists may require training by outside agencies.

Specialization should be directed only after all personnel gain thorough proficiency in common skills needed to survive in combat (marksmanship, hygiene, etc.). All should demonstrate proficiency before being considered for promotion, with only the fully qualified being promoted. Leaders should be judged and rewarded on the basis of demonstrated excellence achieved by subordinates.

Effective small unit leader training depends on "participative management;" therefore, squad and platoon leaders must understand and be able to translate policies and programs into small unit activities. If done effectively, such action reinforces leader authority and inspires confidence among followers.

TOPIC 2: PLANS AND PROGRAMS

- A. What criteria should be used to determine the duration of the planning cycle?
- B. Should the training cycle be determined by the budget cycle or by other considerations?

PANEL 1

- 1. Should unit commanders be allocated resources before or after planning their training?
- 2. Should unit commanders attach greater importance to the availability of money and facilities or to attaining levels of individual training proficiency, when developing training plans and programs?

PANEL 2

- 1. How can training standardization be achieved throughout an Army without inhibiting the unit commander?
- 2. Is training standardization mandatory or desirable in every skill area?

PANEL 3

To gain maximum benefit from resources expended, what portion of training should be conducted as unilateral branch training? Combined arms training? Joint training? Combined training?

PANEL 4

How should exercises be designed to evaluate the level of training proficiency and to concurrently increase the level of proficiency?

PANEL 5

Should the same training criteria and priorities be applied at all levels of the chain of command?

SUMMARY OF DISCUSSIONS OF TOPIC 2

All panels agreed that the identification and establishment of cycles should be done pragmatically, on the basis of realities that exist within each country and at each echelon. Considerations are: (1) combat missions; (2) specific objectives enunciated by higher echelons; (3) availability of resources; (4) cycle of personnel actions; (5) cycle of budget planning;

(6) skill level of planners and programmers at each echelon; (7) forecasting lead times imposed by outside agencies; (8) probability of change(s) within the duration of the planning cycle; (9) organizational complexity of the forces to be trained; (10) distribution of decision changing authority among echelons and within staff elements; and (11) the immediacy of the threat against which the force is being trained. Since budget, training, and recruitment cycles are interdependent, all must be coordinated, with least-cost penalties being the logical determinant for policy adoption. Additional considerations are the factors outside military control: weather, seasons, and holidays.

There was a split opinion as to whether unit commanders should use the "zero-base" approach and calculate every expense anew each year, or modify programs of preceding years. A major determinant is the accountability system used by any given Army, the management skills possessed by junior officers, and the trade-off involved in spending time on management tasks rather than on training itself. It was conceded that the ultimate training objective ought to remain uppermost in the minds of all training supervisors, with resource shortfalls being compensated for by innovation.

Standardization as a goal in itself is not meritorious, but may serve to meet the needs of globally deployed armies in which personnel transfer often, or to enhance quality control and promote compliance with central policy directives. Desirable standardization can be achieved by promulgation of simple, lucid standards that endure through successive training cycles. A feedback mechanism to gauge acceptance and extent of application is imperative and will provide a means for collecting and incorporating modifications that enhance effectiveness or efficiency. Standardization is also imperative if interoperability among multinational forces is to be achieved. This is particularly true for high-level skills where there is little or no tolerance for error. It is also true for those functional areas where there must be direct contact between binational and multinational forces.

No agreement was reached as to the proper proportion of time that should be dedicated to branch, combined arms, joint, and combined training because each mission would exact different requirements.

Exercises can be designed to test and validate probable contingency missions, and can therefore provide a training vehicle for familiarizing key personnel with these missions as well as for team training. If exercises are designed with "halts," remedial training and reevaluation are possible, but this should be balanced with the need to maintain realism. Exercises should be undertaken only after individuals, teams, and small units have demonstrated tactical proficiency and doctrinal familiarity appropriate to their mission requirements.

TOPIC 3: METHODS AND TECHNIQUES

A. How much training is absolutely necessary to attain and maintain training proficiency for combat operations?

B. What is the optimum mix of simulation and live fire training? Should individuals and units be required to attain prescribed proficiency levels in their preparatory training prior to being allowed to engage in maneuver and live fire training?

C. What unique or innovative method or techniques can be applied to compensate for cost inflation and other training constraints?

PANEL 1

1. How should officers and NCO's be trained? In or outside the unit? Or both?

2. What is the optimum mix of unit and external training? What is the optimum frequency of officer and NCO training?

PANEL 2

1. What considerations should govern marksmanship training? What portion of resources should be dedicated to live fire? Should live fire be the sole determination of proficiency?

2. How many rounds per year per type of weapon should be expended?

PANEL 3

1. What is the optimum method of training for urban areas? For jungles? For deserts? For amphibious operations? For arctic operations?

2. What can be used to compensate for the absence of these environments within a given country?

PANEL 4

1. What techniques can be used for training to fill gaps in scheduled training?

2. How can specialized subjects such as nuclear, biological and chemical, and patrolling be taught as discrete training? When integrated within unit training?

3. How should physical training be integrated into unit training?

PANEL 5

1. How should map reading be taught? Proficiency maintained?
2. What criteria should be used to select and train drivers? Maintain proficiency?

SUMMARY OF DISCUSSIONS OF TOPIC 3

The amount of training absolutely necessary can be determined only by identifying "hard" discrete mission requirements, to include minimum levels of individual and team proficiency -- as is done with the US Army SQT and ARTEP, then evaluating the degree of achievement using those standards. Subsequent training should be designed to sustain skill levels and to remedy deficiencies identified during successive evaluations. In all cases, training detractors must be minimized, and soldiers should be organized and equipped as they will fight. Shortages should be expected as a "way of life" in combat situations. Therefore, training with a full complement may actually generate deceptions as to the true level of combat readiness. Cyclic training provides a better and more acceptable approach than do attempts at sustaining peak readiness in conditions short of actual combat. This allows training to be progressive, with remedies inserted as necessary. Moreover, cycles provide for amalgamation of new personnel into teams (Note: It is accepted that turbulence is inevitable).

Simulation must be considered a supplement to live firing and training, and may be used to validate proficiency achieved preparatory to live training or to sustain skill levels acquired from live training. All participants endorsed simulation as a cost-effective supplement, but not as a substitute.

Cost savings can accrue through the use of subcaliber devices, command post exercises, heightened cost-consciousness programs, moving targets, improved marksmanship techniques, and elimination of nice-to-have, even if traditional, training and ceremonial details.

Although the optimum mix of unit training and school training for officers and NCO's is not quantifiable, there was a strong consensus that more unit training is desirable. Unit training reinforces leadership role training, teamwork, and achieves economy of resources. Further unit training strengthens the chain of command.

Geographic and environmental training can be accomplished most effectively and economically through exchange programs and combined training exercises with other armies. Armies, however, should not engage in these to the detriment of easily recognized home defense requirements.

Training to fill gaps in scheduled training is dependent on the leadership and imagination of small unit leaders and is ideal as a mechanism for conducting remedial training. The key to achieving results is prior preparation in anticipation that these gaps will occur.

Specialized training can and should be integrated into unit training, so long as it does not detract from mission-oriented training. Other miscellaneous subjects were also discussed: (1) the use of competitive events to heighten individual interest in training; (2) the need for training managers to consider the entrance qualifications an individual possesses when determining the type of military training required; and (3) the need for training managers to consider education and literacy levels prior to establishing the pace of training.

PACIFIC ARMIES MANAGEMENT SEMINAR V
16-20 November 1981
Manila, Republic of the Philippines

REPORT OF THE PLANNING AND STEERING COMMITTEES

1. The Planning Committee with COL Benjamin N. Santos, PA and COL Edward Y. Hirata, USA as co-chairmen met at 1600, 17 November 1981 to discuss proposed themes, sites, and dates for future PAMS conference.

a. The themes recommended were:

- (1) Interoperability
- (2) Manpower Resources Management
- (3) Combat Support and Combat Service Support Management and Systems
- (4) Counterinsurgency

b. The following hosts, sites, and dates were recommended:

(1) ROK Army offered to co-host PAMS VII with WESTCOM in October 1983. Funding lead time was mentioned as a constraint for co-hosting PAMS VI.

(2) WESTCOM to co-host PAMS VI in Fall of 1982 in Hawaii with one of the Pacific Island countries, whose facilities may not be large enough to handle the seminar.

(3) Philippine Army and WESTCOM to co-host PAMS VI in November 1982 in either Hawaii or the Philippines.

c. The committee members from many of the countries felt that they could not comfortably discuss co-hosting PAMS in their countries because they had not discussed the issue with their superiors as to funding.

d. The committee recommended that guidance be issued to all countries in advance so that member countries of future planning committees will be adequately prepared to discuss co-hosting the seminar.

2. The steering committee with COL Nolan M. Sigler, USA and COL Franklin V. Samonte, PA as co-chairmen met at 1645, 19 November 1981. All the members of the committee were present for a discussion of the findings and recommendations of the planning committee concerning PAMS VI, VII, and VIII.

a. The decision of the committee was that PAMS VI will be held in Hawaii between August and September next year (1982). PAMS VII will be held in Korea and PAMS VIII in New Zealand. The final dates will be announced later.

b. The committee members from the represented nations felt that they could not address the co-hosting of PAMS in their respective countries because they had not as yet discussed funding issues with their superiors.

c. The committee examined the proposed themes and concluded that "Interoperability" should be the theme for PAMS VI. Further, the seminar should examine within the time constraints allotted all aspects of the subject; e.g., logistics, communication, training, etc. Subordinate topics will be "Manpower Resources Management" and "Combat Support and Combat Service Support Management and Systems."

PACIFIC ARMIES MANAGEMENT SEMINAR V

20 NOVEMBER 1981

MANILA, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

CLOSING REMARKS

LIEUTENANT GENERAL EUGENE P. FORRESTER
COMMANDER, US ARMY WESTERN COMMAND

CLOSING REMARKS

Time moves on very rapidly and I'll limit my remarks this afternoon. I did want to review some thoughts that have come to my mind in the last couple of days as to where we are and where we are going with the PAMS series. First of all, I think that we must express appreciation to the Philippine Army for their superb performance as our hosts here in the Philippine Islands. The Republic of the Philippines can be extraordinarily proud of the enormously effective way in which they have pulled together the physical facilities and the personnel to manage this very important conference for us. I wish you all would join me with a round of applause for the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine Government for their assistance here.

I think it would be appropriate also this afternoon to review the purpose of PAMS. There are many things that go through your mind: what you got out of it, what you expected to get out of it, and what you would hope that you would derive from it in the days ahead. But basically, PAMS is a grouping of people, voluntary in nature, with a goal of providing security and welfare for the countries concerned. Professional soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines around the world seek to avoid conflict. They seek to avoid conflict because those who would be first involved and the most likely to die are those who happen to serve in their armed forces. By your presence, you represent, for your country, a professional excellence that demonstrates their willingness to share ideas and thoughts related to the collective security in this part of the world. No matter what your political party in your own country, or your call of faith around the world, what we are interested in is providing a forum where people can voluntarily work in a collateral way toward insuring the rights and goals of the people of their own particular country. As I reflect upon the speeches which we have heard here in the past few days, I was particularly reminded that General Ver put it in very clear perspective when he noted that people have different views of their own security. People see the threat in different ways. What may be perceived as a threat to one nation may not be for another. Admiral Long also touched upon that in the question and answer period. But all of us should be interested in the freedom and the welfare of the people of our respective countries. Some of us may be smaller in size, population and geography, and some may not have the largest gross national product, nor the largest military establishment, but together we represent a very formidable force, which is a very specific counter to possible aggression in this part of the world. Admiral Long noted that the United States' interest here is very real, and your presence here shows your real interest in the Pacific. We welcome the opportunity to work closely with you.

I am sure that some of you were mind-boggled by General Becton's presentation of all the responsibilities that the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) has in terms of training the large United States Army. But that merely reflects lots of years of experience and many ideas that have been derived from your nations in the past and from our continuing association with you. The fact that all of you have reflected and dealt with training and the management of training in the last few days can only be helpful to us as we provide input to TRADOC as to better ways in which we can look at the training goals of the United States Army and our associates around the world.

Finally, I was very impressed in reviewing General Park's words. Not only did he talk about some of the logistics problems and the training of logistics personnel, but he also noted what contributions soldiers, sailors and marines make to their nations while they are serving and after they serve. All of us provide a part of the vast reservoir of man power, woman power, soldier power and civilian power that works together to better the goals of our nations.

Our subject matter has been primarily devoted to training, and having just recently come from the Chief of Staff of the Army's annual Commanders Conference, I can only say that there is nothing higher on the Chief of Staff's mind than the training of the United States Army. He recognizes that there are horrible distractors to our training role such as the maintenance of post, camp and station, the care of equipment, the distances to training areas, and the shortage of ammunition. He is looking for imaginative, creative managers of training, and also, soldier trainers who can take relatively inexperienced young men and women, bring them in, and mold them in a way that if war should come tomorrow or next year, they would acquit themselves well as citizens of their country, but more importantly, as protectors of the freedom around the world.

I think we can all look to the future of PAMS. I think that it can provide us with a very splendid tapestry to work on, as far as the future goes, in linking the armies and all the nations more closely together in this part of the world. President Marcos put it in very good perspective when he noted that there are very difficult times ahead. I am sure that nothing would have pleased him more than to be able to say that almost all the problems are solved. Although we do not have the political decisions, and although we do not have the vast economic decisions and the fiscal responsibilities that befall President Marcos and the leaders of our respective nations, inevitably we take a small portion of the resources and mold them together, dealing as best we can with what we have, to do the job as befalls us today. Earlier today, one of our delegates noted that we never seem to have enough to do all the things we need to do. And I felt that Colonel Sigler put it in perspective very clearly, when he said that no one ever has quite enough and you can't spend yourself out of existence with your insurance money, you have to balance how much you can put into it. And that is the way fire departments are, police departments are, but more specially, it is the way the military services are.

And so, it behooves us all to seek better ways to do our jobs. I know that many of the ideas which you have offered and the thoughts which you have shared with us, can only be beneficial to us in the days ahead.

Once again, I cherish my hours here. From a personal point of view, it has been extremely pleasant; I have had a chance to associate with many of the leaders of the Republic of the Philippines and I shall carry away, as many of you have noted today, very, very pleasant memories. I look forward to the final report and all the results of the deliberations here, and I look forward to the final decision as to what the future will bring, as to where and when we'll hold our next meetings. Thank you so very much.

PACIFIC ARMIES MANAGEMENT SEMINAR V

20 NOVEMBER 1981

MANILA, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

CLOSING REMARKS

MAJOR GENERAL JOSEPHUS Q. RAMAS

COMMANDING GENERAL, PHILIPPINE ARMY

CLOSING REMARKS

General Forrester, general officers, observers, the Secretariat and other participants:

Many of the thoughts I had planned to address have already been most candidly and elegantly expressed by General Forrester. So, instead of three centavos worth of comments, I need now only present two.

We were very fortunate to hear General Becton's most incisive lecture. Other distinguished speakers presented their equally illuminating thoughts on training management. In my closing remarks, however, I address my thoughts to a somewhat lower management level to mention what I perceive as some of the basic concerns and comments expressed by the participants from the developing nations of the Pacific.

Military leaders of the more modest Armed Forces and, specifically, General Ver with the Philippine Army, have always been concerned with training. Their thoughts, in essence, are that it is far better for soldiers to suffer and sweat in realistic, meaningful training than it is for these soldiers to bleed and die in battle. That is the rationale for all training, regardless of whether the soldiers are from a superpower nation or from the smallest republic represented here. On that, as General Forrester so eloquently pointed out, we, as soldiers, all agree.

We, who are members of the armed forces, plus most of our leaders, recognize that the soldier should be the last to wish for war. He is the first to man the front lines and the first to be exposed to the tragedy and carnage of war. Our leaders thus recognize that we should train ourselves so finely and equip ourselves so well as to be able to prevent precisely the carnage we are trained to accomplish. It is the uniformed soldier, rather than any other sector of society, who will bear the brunt of the holocaust. I may be repetitive in this thought, but as something we all can share, I deem its repetition appropriate.

Another point I would like to mention is that following the lecture of Admiral Long, I became aware of some misconceptions concerning his remarks. I was informed by some of our people that certain Philippine elements, and others from foreign nations, had either deliberately or innocently misinterpreted the thoughts and intent of the Admiral's presentation. The information which reached me contained some very disturbing misrepresentations. It was alleged that Admiral Long, representing the superpower, had stated that the United States had come here to start the wheels rolling for a grand military alliance among Pacific nations. Of course, you and I who belong to the armies represented here know that this is a falsehood. I mention this only so that the official records of our proceedings will reflect that we are only representatives of our respective armed forces, we are not architects of foreign policy.

In our country at least, and as I know in the US, the architect of foreign policy is always the Chief Executive of that country. In our case, only the President of the Philippines is responsible for foreign policy. Therefore, disturbing or misrepresented reports about the grand alliance being "cooked-up"

here in this forum are totally out of the question, for this is neither the forum nor the level at which political questions can be examined or, much less, decided. I state this because I, as a co-host, want to put the record in the right perspective to preempt further misrepresentation and misunderstandings about the forum that is the Pacific Armies Management Seminar. For we know that we're gathered here on a very voluntary basis, nobody twisted our arms to come here. We came, perhaps on invitation, but all of us came here voluntarily. And, we came seeking knowledge and in the process of seeking knowledge, giving knowledge in return. We are here to sit down and discuss matters, in order to support some of the very basic dictums of security for our respective countries.

It is the primordial duty of any country or any nation, no matter how big or small, to prepare for the defense of its people. So, if that be so, we are here to exchange ideas and to learn from each other so that we may perform this duty more efficiently. If we find these thoughts applicable to our specific countries, we are free to adopt or modify them to our needs. One fellow's ideas may be just as good as the other's, but together they may become a synthesis of what our armies need for the future. This, I think, from the developing countries' point of view, is the real meaning of PAMS.

As I said in my remarks opening PAMS V, over and above the exchanged expertise, within the ranges of the fancy lectures to the modest presentations, we have developed a camaraderie and a better understanding for one another during these few days. The personal contacts and the friendly eyeball to eyeball confrontation can only lead to improved relationships among us. I believe I can say without fear of successful contradiction, that we have achieved "100 plus" in benefits from this seminar.

General Forrester, I think that each and every one of us deserves a big round of applause for the friendship that we have developed here. So, I say to each of us, we should pat ourselves on the back, for we have achieved something which a couple of years ago would never have been thought to be possible. To General Forrester, and all my brothers in the audience, we must not retreat from that which we have achieved here. We must continue this interchange, for it is in this manner that we may well be able to influence the future of the Pacific.

I would like to end my "two-centavos' worth" by expressing to each and every one of you, in the name of our people, our country and the President, the Chief of Staff, General Ver, and the Philippine Army in particular, that this seminar has given us the distinct privilege and honor of having each and every one of you here. I hope that you have fallen in love with our country and our people, just as we have with you.

Thank you.

PACIFIC ARMIES MANAGEMENT SEMINAR V

16-20 NOVEMBER 1981

MANILA, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

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